Southeast Asian States Have Their Own Views on the Ukraine War

IF 1.3
Asia Policy Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI:10.1353/asp.2023.0020
J. Reeves
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Abstract

J ust as Southeast Asia has emerged as the center of gravity for the countries of the global West’s respective Indo-Pacific strategies, so too has the region become a priority area for Western diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the start of the conflict, the United States, in particular, has lobbied Southeast Asian states and the secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn Russia’s aggression and to comply with Western sanctions against Moscow. In May 2022, for example, the Biden administration raised the Ukraine war in discussions with Southeast Asian leaders at their summit in Washington and tried to insert language in a joint U.S.-ASEAN vision statement criticizing Russia’s militarism, ultimately having to settle instead for more vague language on support for territorial sovereignty and international law.1 Similarly, in 2022, the entire Western cohort of the G-20 pressured then host Indonesia to include language criticizing Russia’s invasion in the group’s joint statement. According to one European sous-sherpa involved in the statement’s drafting, China and India also partially supported this language, which therefore made it possible to include.2 In at least one instance, however, European leaders were unable to bring their Southeast Asian counterparts on side with their criticism of Russia. In a December 2022 joint statement following an EU-ASEAN summit, negotiators failed to draft a common critique of Russia’s actions.3 Neither have Western leaders had much success in securing Southeast Asian state support in condemnation of the war at the bilateral level, aside from Singapore, which is unique in the region for its relative acceptance
东南亚国家对乌克兰战争有自己的看法
正如东南亚已成为全球西方国家各自印太战略的重心一样,该地区也成为西方外交在俄乌战争中的优先领域。自冲突开始以来,尤其是美国,一直在游说东南亚国家和东盟(ASEAN)秘书处谴责俄罗斯的侵略行为,并遵守西方对莫斯科的制裁。例如,2022年5月,拜登政府在与东南亚领导人在华盛顿举行的峰会上讨论乌克兰战争问题时,曾试图在美国-东盟联合愿景声明中加入批评俄罗斯军国主义的措辞,但最终不得不在支持领土主权和国际法方面使用更模糊的措辞同样,在2022年,20国集团的整个西方国家向当时的东道主印度尼西亚施压,要求其在集团的联合声明中加入批评俄罗斯入侵的措辞。据参与起草声明的一名欧洲副协调人说,中国和印度也部分支持这一措辞,因此有可能列入2然而,至少在一个例子中,欧洲领导人无法让他们的东南亚同行站在他们对俄罗斯的批评一边。在2022年12月欧盟-东盟峰会后发表的联合声明中,谈判代表未能起草一份对俄罗斯行动的共同批评除了新加坡之外,西方领导人在双边层面上也没有成功地获得东南亚国家的支持,谴责战争,新加坡在该地区是独一无二的,因为它相对接受战争
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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