Juan Carlos Zambrano Jurado, José Gabriel Astaíza Gómez, J. D. García-Racines
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this article, we analyze the mechanism design for the remuneration to the reduction of energy losses of a natural monopoly through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The objective of this research is to characterize the optimal regulation that induces reductions in electrical energy losses. In our methodology, we use a differential equation, its HJB representation, and an exponential utility function. The results suggest that the optimal contract is based on the agent's continuation value as a state variable. The article contributes to the analysis of control problems in conditions of incomplete information and incorporates information asymmetries and incentives in regulation. Among the future lines of research are the application of the model to specific energy markets and the empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed regulation.
期刊介绍:
Contaduría y Administración (Accounting and Management)is a quarterly journal aimed to the academic community. Being peer-reviewed by double blind process,seeks to contribute to the advancement of scientific and technical knowledge in the financial and administrative disciplines. This journal publishes original theoretical or applied research (No case studies, descriptive and exploratory) in Spanish and English on the following subjects: • Organization Management • Production Management and Operations • Human Resources Management • Management of Information Technology • Accounting and Auditing • Management and Leadership • Business Economics • Entrepreneurship • Business Environment • Finance • Operations Research • Innovation and Technological Change in Organizations • Marketing • Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises • Planning and Business Strategies • Management Theory • Financial Theory • Business Decisions Contaduría y Administración (Accounting and Management) also receives research papers on related areas to the above mentioned.