The Effects of Post-conflict Constitutional Designs: the “Ohrid Framework Agreement” and the Macedonian Constitution

Abstract

Abstract In regions troubled by ethnic based conflict violence often erupts abruptly and severely. Peacemakers, then, follow unconditional paths to prevent conflict escalation. The article analyzes the ways in which post-conflict constitutional designs shape the state structure through constitutional amendments. Peace agreements as bases for constitutional reform, the article claims, have reformatory but also obstructive implications. Seeing the Ohrid Framework Agreement as a case study, the paper analyzes its implications on the development of the political system in Macedonia. On one side OFA serves as a criterion for the Macedonian Euro-Atlantic integration and a driving force for the creation of a functioning multicultural society. On the other side, the procedural and substantive flaws of the agreement undermine its absorbability in the society. In procedural sense, OFA hindered its own implementation through the used terminology and the drafting process. In substantial sense, agreement’s goals and provisions reached beyond the purpose of peace agreements and underestimated the complexity of the conflicting issues at stake.