The politics of distributing blame and credit: Evidence from a survey experiment with Norwegian local politicians

IF 3.6 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
NANNA LAURITZ SCHÖNHAGE, MARTIN BÆKGAARD, BENNY GEYS
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

How do politicians attribute responsibility for good and poor policy outcomes across multiple stakeholders in a policy field where they themselves can affect service provision? Such ‘diffusion’ decisions are crucial to understand the political calculations underlying the allocation of blame and credit by office-holders. We study this issue using a between-subjects survey experiment fielded among local politicians in Norway (N = 1073). We find that local politicians attribute responsibility for outcomes in primary education predominantly to school personnel (regardless of whether performance is good or bad) and do not engage in local party-political blame games. However, we show that local politicians are keen to attribute responsibility for poor outcomes to higher levels of government, especially when these are unaligned with the party of the respondent. These findings suggest that vertical partisan blame-shifting prevails over horizontal partisan blame games in settings with a political consensus culture.

Abstract Image

分配责任和荣誉的政治:来自挪威地方政治家调查实验的证据
在一个政治领域中,政治家如何将政策成果好坏的责任归咎于多个利益相关者,而他们自己又能影响服务的提供?这种 "扩散 "决策对于理解公职人员分配责任和功劳所依据的政治计算至关重要。我们通过对挪威的地方政治家(N = 1073)进行受试者间调查实验来研究这一问题。我们发现,地方政治家将初等教育成果的责任主要归咎于学校人员(无论成绩好坏),并不参与地方政党政治的指责游戏。然而,我们的研究表明,地方政治家热衷于将不良结果的责任归咎于更高级别的政府,尤其是当这些政府与受访者所在的政党不一致时。这些研究结果表明,在具有政治共识文化的环境中,纵向党派推卸责任比横向党派推卸责任游戏更为普遍。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
5.70%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: European Journal of Political Research specialises in articles articulating theoretical and comparative perspectives in political science, and welcomes both quantitative and qualitative approaches. EJPR also publishes short research notes outlining ongoing research in more specific areas of research. The Journal includes the Political Data Yearbook, published as a double issue at the end of each volume.
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