{"title":"Barrett’s cognitive science of religion vs. theism & atheism: a compatibilist approach","authors":"Heather Morris","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1791232","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Naturalistic explanations for religious beliefs, in the form of the cognitive science of religion (CSR), have become increasingly popular in the contemporary sphere of philosophy and theology. Some claim to provide proof that theism, or religion more generally, is falsified, whilst others suggest that their theories are compatible with holding religious beliefs. In the following, I focus on the CSR of Justin L. Barrett, in order to argue that this particular naturalistic explanation can be seen to be compatible with both theism and atheism. Although Barrett is a proponent of his CSR’s compatibility with theism, and his work appears to imply that he is an incompatibilist when it comes to atheism and CSR, it is not immediately clear whether: (i) his CSR is definitely compatible with theism; and, (ii) why it should be seen as incompatible with atheism. I investigate these questions, utilising and extending research and tools from David Leech and Aku Visala, to argue for the conclusion that Barrett’s CSR is compatible with both theism and atheism, despite what his work implies. I consider the impact this has on the broader sphere of CSR, naturalistic explanations, and different religious worldviews.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"386 - 403"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1791232","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1791232","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACT Naturalistic explanations for religious beliefs, in the form of the cognitive science of religion (CSR), have become increasingly popular in the contemporary sphere of philosophy and theology. Some claim to provide proof that theism, or religion more generally, is falsified, whilst others suggest that their theories are compatible with holding religious beliefs. In the following, I focus on the CSR of Justin L. Barrett, in order to argue that this particular naturalistic explanation can be seen to be compatible with both theism and atheism. Although Barrett is a proponent of his CSR’s compatibility with theism, and his work appears to imply that he is an incompatibilist when it comes to atheism and CSR, it is not immediately clear whether: (i) his CSR is definitely compatible with theism; and, (ii) why it should be seen as incompatible with atheism. I investigate these questions, utilising and extending research and tools from David Leech and Aku Visala, to argue for the conclusion that Barrett’s CSR is compatible with both theism and atheism, despite what his work implies. I consider the impact this has on the broader sphere of CSR, naturalistic explanations, and different religious worldviews.
期刊介绍:
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology publishes scholarly articles and reviews that concern the intersection between philosophy and theology. It aims to stimulate the creative discussion between various traditions, for example the analytical and the continental traditions. Articles should exhibit high-level scholarship but should be readable for those coming from other philosophical traditions. Fields of interest are: philosophy, especially philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and philosophical ethics, and systematic theology, for example fundamental theology, dogmatic and moral theology. Contributions focusing on the history of these disciplines are also welcome, especially when they are relevant to contemporary discussions.