Asymmetric awareness and heterogeneous agents

IF 1.3 4区 社会学 Q3 SOCIOLOGY
Antoine Dubus
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Abstract

We consider a principal-agent model with moral-hazard and asymmetric awareness and show how the heterogeneity of agents on their aversion to effort affects contract design. We discuss the optimal contract adopted when a principal is aware of all the impacts of an agent’s action, while agents ignore some of them. When a principal faces two types of agents, where one type is more effort-averse than the other, the equilibrium contract is shaped by agent proportions: it pools the agents, separates them, or excludes the more effort-averse agents from the contract. When efforts are observable, all the agents remain unaware, while when efforts are hidden, a principal increases the awareness of the agents to a level commensurate with the nature of the contract. JEL Codes – D82; D83; D86
非对称意识和异构代理
我们考虑了一个具有道德风险和不对称意识的委托代理模型,并展示了代理人对努力的厌恶程度的异质性如何影响契约设计。我们讨论了当委托人知道代理人行为的所有影响,而代理人忽略其中一些影响时所采用的最优契约。当委托人面对两种类型的代理人时,其中一种类型比另一种类型更不愿付出努力,均衡契约是由代理人比例塑造的:它将代理人聚集在一起,将他们分开,或者将更不愿付出努力的代理人排除在契约之外。当努力是可见的,所有的代理人都不知道,而当努力是隐藏的,委托人将代理人的意识提高到与契约性质相称的水平。JEL代码- D82;D83;D86
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
21
期刊介绍: Rationality & Society focuses on the growing contributions of rational-action based theory, and the questions and controversies surrounding this growth. Why Choose Rationality and Society? The trend toward ever-greater specialization in many areas of intellectual life has lead to fragmentation that deprives scholars of the ability to communicate even in closely adjoining fields. The emergence of the rational action paradigm as the inter-lingua of the social sciences is a remarkable exception to this trend. It is the one paradigm that offers the promise of bringing greater theoretical unity across disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, cognitive psychology, moral philosophy and law.
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