Balanced Budget Requirements Revisited

IF 0.5 Q4 ECONOMICS
Sharon N. Kioko, Michelle L. Lofton
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We test the effect of balanced budget requirements (BBRs) on budget outcomes using data published in audited financial statements. With a focus on the General Fund, we find states frequently reported deficits in their adopted budgets and relied on sizeable and favorable expenditure variances to close budget gaps before the end of the budget period. Empirical analysis shows that technical or strict BBRs procedures did not increase the likelihood that a state would report a balanced budget. We corroborate our findings using fund balance data. If technical or strict BBRs are effective, states would report higher fund balances, all else equal. Results show that states that adopted political BBRs reported lower fund balances. More importantly, the adoption of strict or technical BBRs did not lead to higher fund balances.
修订平衡预算要求
我们使用经审计的财务报表中公布的数据来测试平衡预算要求(BBR)对预算结果的影响。以普通基金为重点,我们发现各州经常在其通过的预算中报告赤字,并依靠可观且有利的支出差异在预算期结束前弥补预算缺口。实证分析表明,技术性或严格的BBR程序并没有增加一个州报告预算平衡的可能性。我们使用资金余额数据证实了我们的发现。如果技术性或严格的BBR有效,各州将报告更高的资金余额,其他情况都一样。结果显示,采用政治BBR的州报告的资金余额较低。更重要的是,采用严格的或技术性的BBR并没有导致更高的资金余额。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: Public Finance Review is a professional forum devoted to US policy-oriented economic research and theory, which focuses on a variety of allocation, distribution and stabilization functions within the public-sector economy. Economists, policy makers, political scientists, and researchers all rely on Public Finance Review, to bring them the most up-to-date information on the ever changing US public finance system, and to help them put policies and research into action. Public Finance Review not only presents rigorous empirical and theoretical papers on public economic policies, but also examines and critiques their impact and consequences. The journal analyzes the nature and function of evolving US governmental fiscal policies at the national, state and local levels.
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