Article: The Potential Impact of Pillar Two on Tax Incentives

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW
Intertax Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.54648/taxi2023018
Niels Bammens, Dieter Bettens
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Abstract

After lengthy negotiations, the OECD proposed its model rules on Global Anti-Base Erosion Rules (GloBE) on 20 December 2021. They impose a minimum tax rate of 15% on large multinational companies wherever they operate. Consequentially, the GloBE rules are intended to render tax incentives ineffective to the extent that they reduce the effective tax rate (ETR) on in-scope entities below 15%. Moreover, tax competition should also level off at 15% as tax incentives would no longer increase the attractiveness of a jurisdiction to the extent that they reduce the ETR below this amount. Nevertheless, several design aspects of Pillar Two risk obstructing those objectives. Most notably, the substance based carve-out excludes routine profit from substantive activities from the scope of the GloBE rules on a formulaic basis. This means that incentives can theoretically be maintained and tax competition can continue for this income. In practice, however, the design of the carve-out entails that it does not distinguish between incentives for substantive income and those for non-substantive income. Moreover, the combination of the substance based carve-out and the qualified domestic minimum top-up tax (QDMTT) could result in a new form of tax competition. international effective minimum taxation, GloBE, Pillar Two, tax incentives, substance based carve-out, qualified domestic minimum tax, OECD, tax competition
第二支柱对税收优惠的潜在影响
经过漫长的谈判,经合组织于2021年12月20日提出了《全球反税基侵蚀规则》(GloBE)示范规则。他们对大型跨国公司的最低税率为15%,无论它们在哪里经营。因此,GloBE规则旨在使税收激励措施无效,因为它们将范围内实体的有效税率(ETR)降低到15%以下。此外,税收竞争也应该稳定在15%,因为税收激励将不再增加司法管辖区的吸引力,以至于它们将ETR降低到低于该金额。然而,第二支柱的几个设计方面可能会阻碍这些目标的实现。最值得注意的是,以实质为基础的规定在公式化的基础上将实质性活动的经常性利润排除在全球规则的范围之外。这意味着理论上可以保持激励,税收竞争可以继续。然而,在实践中,分拆的设计要求它不区分实质性收入的奖励和非实质性收入的奖励。此外,基于物质的分拆和合格的国内最低充值税(QDMTT)的结合可能导致一种新的税收竞争形式:国际有效最低税,GloBE,第二支柱,税收激励,基于物质的分拆,合格的国内最低税,经合组织,税收竞争
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来源期刊
Intertax
Intertax LAW-
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
50.00%
发文量
45
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