Does plausible deniability work? Assessing the effectiveness of unclaimed coercive acts in the Ukraine war

IF 4 1区社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Contemporary Security Policy Pub Date : 2023-05-31 DOI:10.1080/13523260.2023.2212464

Costantino Pischedda, Andrew Cheon

引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACT States conduct unclaimed coercive acts, imposing costs on adversaries to signal resolve but denying (or not claiming) responsibility. Some scholars posit that unclaimed acts have considerable potential to coerce targets, while containing escalation risks. Others suggest that unclaimed coercive efforts tend to fail and trigger escalation. We assess these competing perspectives about the effects of unclaimed attacks with a vignette experiment exposing US-based respondents to a scenario where, after Russia warns of unpredictable consequences if NATO continues providing weapons to Ukraine, an explosion occurs at a NATO base in Poland used to funnel weapons to Ukraine. Intelligence agencies and independent analysts identify Russia as the likely culprit, while not ruling out the possibility of an accident. We randomize whether Russia claimed or denied responsibility for the explosion and find that unclaimed acts have lower coercive leverage than claimed ones, but the two do not significantly differ in escalation risk.

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合理的否认有效吗？评估乌克兰战争中无人认领的胁迫行为的有效性

摘要国家实施无人认领的胁迫行为，向对手施加代价以表明决心，但否认（或不声称）责任。一些学者认为，无人认领的行为有很大的潜力胁迫目标，同时遏制升级风险。其他人则认为，无人认领的胁迫努力往往会失败并引发事态升级。我们通过一项小插曲实验评估了这些关于无人认领袭击影响的相互竞争的观点，该实验将美国受访者暴露在一种情况下，即在俄罗斯警告如果北约继续向乌克兰提供武器将产生不可预测的后果后，北约在波兰的一个基地发生爆炸，该基地用于向乌克兰输送武器。情报机构和独立分析人士认定俄罗斯可能是罪魁祸首，但不排除发生事故的可能性。我们随机分析了俄罗斯是否声称或否认对爆炸负责，发现无人认领的行为比声称的行为具有更低的强制杠杆，但两者在升级风险方面没有显著差异。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Contemporary Security Policy Multiple-

CiteScore

14.60

自引率

6.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： One of the oldest peer-reviewed journals in international conflict and security, Contemporary Security Policy promotes theoretically-based research on policy problems of armed conflict, intervention and conflict resolution. Since it first appeared in 1980, CSP has established its unique place as a meeting ground for research at the nexus of theory and policy. Spanning the gap between academic and policy approaches, CSP offers policy analysts a place to pursue fundamental issues, and academic writers a venue for addressing policy. Major fields of concern include: War and armed conflict Peacekeeping Conflict resolution Arms control and disarmament Defense policy Strategic culture International institutions. CSP is committed to a broad range of intellectual perspectives. Articles promote new analytical approaches, iconoclastic interpretations and previously overlooked perspectives. Its pages encourage novel contributions and outlooks, not particular methodologies or policy goals. Its geographical scope is worldwide and includes security challenges in Europe, Africa, the Middle-East and Asia. Authors are encouraged to examine established priorities in innovative ways and to apply traditional methods to new problems.