The World: The Tormented History of an Inescapable Para-Concept

Abstract

The world has not always been there. At least not in philosophy. This two-part article examines the complex interplay of concepts among which the idea of the world appeared, and analyses the characteristics that allow it to play a central role in the space of philosophy. These are found to be fundamentally two. First, its capacity to identify with the idea of a closed, ordered totality (the classic idea of the cosmos), at the same time as it erodes the consistency of the latter and opens the philosophical space onto a positive use of the idea of indetermination. And second, the way in which it operates inside several well-ordered philosophical systems as a point of confusion: as a blurred point that lacks the type of clarity and distinction normally required of philosophical concepts, and that nonetheless appears to be important enough not to be expelled from philosophy. The first part of the article, published in this issue, reconstructs some of the coordinates within which the problematic notion of the world comes to appear. The planned second part will investigate how the idea of the world comes to play a central role within contemporary philosophy by allowing for a new articulation between the idea of the universal and the idea of totality – which produces a cascade of effects, the most notable of which are a new articulation of the idea of subject, and of the relation between philosophy and praxis.