Defaults and Consumer Response to Rainy-Day Funds: Evidence from 401(k) Participants during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Q4 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
David Blanchett, Michael S. Finke, Zhikun Liu
{"title":"Defaults and Consumer Response to Rainy-Day Funds: Evidence from 401(k) Participants during the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"David Blanchett, Michael S. Finke, Zhikun Liu","doi":"10.3905/jor.2022.1.123","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Defaults improve outcomes for passive savers but may also reduce the effectiveness of policies such as rainy-day emergency savings funds that require active choice. We investigate whether active and passive retirement savers responded to a policy change in the 2020 CARES Act that allowed workers to access retirement savings without penalty to meet COVID-19-related spending needs. Using a large database of 401(k) plan participants, we find that workers in occupations with high subsequent unemployment who actively invest were more likely to call about withdrawing funds from their account than workers in default investment options. Evidence that passive savers are less likely to respond to a policy change suggests a possible negative consequence of defaults that can limit the effectiveness of traditional policy solutions that require active choice. Some form of active choice may be needed to increase engagement in a range of employer-provided services such as financial wellness and participant education among passive savers.","PeriodicalId":36429,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Retirement","volume":"10 1","pages":"8 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Retirement","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3905/jor.2022.1.123","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Defaults improve outcomes for passive savers but may also reduce the effectiveness of policies such as rainy-day emergency savings funds that require active choice. We investigate whether active and passive retirement savers responded to a policy change in the 2020 CARES Act that allowed workers to access retirement savings without penalty to meet COVID-19-related spending needs. Using a large database of 401(k) plan participants, we find that workers in occupations with high subsequent unemployment who actively invest were more likely to call about withdrawing funds from their account than workers in default investment options. Evidence that passive savers are less likely to respond to a policy change suggests a possible negative consequence of defaults that can limit the effectiveness of traditional policy solutions that require active choice. Some form of active choice may be needed to increase engagement in a range of employer-provided services such as financial wellness and participant education among passive savers.
违约和消费者对应急基金的反应:来自2019冠状病毒病大流行期间401(k)参与者的证据
违约可以改善被动储蓄者的结果,但也可能降低需要主动选择的应急储蓄基金等政策的有效性。我们调查了主动和被动退休储蓄者是否对2020年《护理法案》中的政策变化做出了反应,该法案允许工人在不受处罚的情况下获得退休储蓄,以满足与covid -19相关的支出需求。通过使用401(k)计划参与者的大型数据库,我们发现,在随后失业率高的职业中,积极投资的工人比在默认投资选项中的工人更有可能打电话要求从他们的账户中提取资金。有证据表明,被动储蓄者不太可能对政策变化做出反应,这表明违约可能产生负面后果,限制需要主动选择的传统政策解决方案的有效性。可能需要某种形式的主动选择,以增加对雇主提供的一系列服务的参与,如财务健康和被动储蓄者的参与教育。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
Journal of Retirement
Journal of Retirement Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Finance
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信