Italian politics at the start of 2023

Abstract

At the beginning of 2023, Italy was governed by a coalition of parties whose pursuit of an unambiguously right-wing policy agenda reflected its solid parliamentary majority (amounting to 237 of 400 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 115 of 200 seats in the Senate) and the weaknesses of the forces of the left. The period since the Government had been sworn in on 22 October had provided ample confirmation that its assumption of office had been the prelude to a clear rightward shift in Italian politics. The election of Ignazio La Russa and Lorenzo Fontana as presidents of the Senate and Chamber respectively had raised eyebrows in view of their past expressions of support for farright causes. The early introduction of legislation ostensibly outlawing rave parties gave rise to a minor public outcry (forcing the government to amend the legislation) when it became apparent that one implication of it would be to outlaw demonstrations and other legitimate expressions of protest. Less than two months after taking office, the Government was locked in conflict with humanitarian vessels rescuing asylum seekers at risk of drowning in the Mediterranean. In December, it was busy keeping its promise to dismantle the anti-poverty citizenship income as well pursuing so-called ‘flat tax’ proposals in conflict with principles of progressivity. It was not surprising, therefore, that in reflecting, on 4 January, on the new government’s first 100 days (or, more accurately, its first 74 days), la Repubblica editor, Maurizio Molinari, was moved to observe that in a country with 15 million people living below the poverty threshold there was a real risk of growing inequality arising from the Government’s agenda. Extreme inequality not only significantly restricts the power and opportunities available to the many at the bottom of the distribution it also restricts the ability of governments to invest in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century such as climate change. For example, the authors of the ‘World Inequality Report 2022’ make the point that steeply progressive taxation was crucial to ensuring the political and social acceptability of the increased taxation that made possible the rise of the modern welfare states of the middle of the twentieth century. They point out that given the very large volumes of wealth increasingly concentrated at the top of the distribution, even ‘modest progressive taxes can generate significant revenues for governments’. Wealth concentration in Italy is high – in 2021, the top 10% of the population owned 48% of household wealth, while the bottom half held just 10% – but lower than in most EU countries. Therefore, while it is not as significant a problem as in comparable countries, it is unlikely to lose its salience as a political issue. For example, bearing in mind that income and wealth inequalities are tightly connected to differences in contributions to climate change and that such differences are extreme, it is clear that effective climate policies will need to target the wealthy polluters more. In Italy, for instance, the top 1% of emitters in 2019 produced on average 63.0 tonnes of CO2 per capita, the bottom 50%, 5.2 tonnes. The experience of France – where in 2018 a hike in the carbon tax, combined with the abolition of the CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 2023, VOL. 15, NO. 1, 1–4 https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2023.2167317