{"title":"China’s offensive in Southeast Asia: regional architecture and the process of Sinicization","authors":"A. Suehiro","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2017.1391619","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT During the 1990s, China had aimed at constructing good relations with neighboring countries including ASEAN members. After the start of external offensive strategy in 2001, China began to accelerate its economic involvement in Asian countries in general, and ASEAN countries in particular. At the same time, China has attempted to create China-led institutional framework and to make the region suitable to Chinese existence. This activity is called “the process of Sinicization” in this article. To explore the process of Sinicization in reference to China’s relations with CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) and Thailand, or China’s relations with ASEAN members, the author examines in detail two cases of the Greater Mekong Subregion Scheme or GMS (since 1992) and the Nanning-based China-ASEAN EXPO or CAEXPO (since 2004) in addition to comparison of Chinese and Japanese economic involvement in Southeast Asia. Through these case studies, the author will clarify the fact that both GMS and CAEXPO become strategic institutions/organizations for not only the promotion of regional cooperation but also the creation of China-led initiatives, such as various China-ASEAN forums. Furthermore, GMS and CAEXPO have also served as instruments to support economic development of border areas in China. Finally, by reviewing the recent movement of the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) strategy and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB, the author posits that Chinese external offensive will be modified in the process of the OBOR and AIIB’s adjustment to international circumstances.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":"107 - 131"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2017-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2017.1391619","citationCount":"11","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2017.1391619","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Abstract
ABSTRACT During the 1990s, China had aimed at constructing good relations with neighboring countries including ASEAN members. After the start of external offensive strategy in 2001, China began to accelerate its economic involvement in Asian countries in general, and ASEAN countries in particular. At the same time, China has attempted to create China-led institutional framework and to make the region suitable to Chinese existence. This activity is called “the process of Sinicization” in this article. To explore the process of Sinicization in reference to China’s relations with CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) and Thailand, or China’s relations with ASEAN members, the author examines in detail two cases of the Greater Mekong Subregion Scheme or GMS (since 1992) and the Nanning-based China-ASEAN EXPO or CAEXPO (since 2004) in addition to comparison of Chinese and Japanese economic involvement in Southeast Asia. Through these case studies, the author will clarify the fact that both GMS and CAEXPO become strategic institutions/organizations for not only the promotion of regional cooperation but also the creation of China-led initiatives, such as various China-ASEAN forums. Furthermore, GMS and CAEXPO have also served as instruments to support economic development of border areas in China. Finally, by reviewing the recent movement of the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) strategy and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB, the author posits that Chinese external offensive will be modified in the process of the OBOR and AIIB’s adjustment to international circumstances.