{"title":"ZIMBABWE BETWEEN THE REFERENDUM AND THE ELECTIONS","authors":"S. Kibble","doi":"10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.131","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\"Has any Zimbabwean election ever solved anything?\" \"The problem is not the constitution but who counts the votes.\" (Local voices) (1)) 1. Introduction The recent overwhelming 'Yes' vote in the constitutional referendum on 16 March has led to two seemingly contradictory developments. The way has opened up for elections later in the year (the date has to be announced by 29 June), but it is unlikely that these will occur in a free and fair environment as demanded by the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and by international donors who may provide the funding. By law Zimbabwe has to have set an election date by the end of June 2013 and before such elections the regional body SADC insisted that there be a referendum on a new constitution as agreed in inter-party negotiations after 2008. This took place peacefully, although amid a wider climate of intimidation and arrests, (2)) and the electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour. (3)) The negotiations over the latter in the Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee (COPAC) have dragged on since 2009. Finally a draft constitution was agreed in mid-January 2013 with all parties making concessions at the last minute. The sticking points were choosing presidential running mates (a big problem for both Mugabe and Tsvangirai given faction fighting), devolution, a Constitutional Court, a National Prosecuting Authority separate from the partisan Attorney General, and reducing the powers of the executive. Many see the draft as very flawed but with little choice but to accept it. As things stand, if elections are not called in the first half of 2013 the government becomes ultra vires. (4)) There has always been a tendency in ZANU-PF to maintain the semblance of legality (even if post-hoc on occasion) despite its methods. There has been no significant progress towards security reforms/governance to prevent the violence of the 2008 elections being repeated or other reforms to ensure a free(ish) and fair(ish) election such as a truly autonomous electoral commission (ZEC) and reform of the degraded voters roll. Legislation to establish a Human Rights Commission passed through Parliament but its provisions on impunity for abuses until recently attracted much civil society criticism. Western donors seem very keen to re-engage Harare despite the volatile human rights situation. In February 2013 we had four years of the 'Inclusive (or Unified) Government' (IG/GNU) following the signing in September 2008 of the 'Global Political Agreement' (GPA) between the former sole ruling party ZANU-PF and its challengers, the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Many activists see that ZANU-PF has used the space of the GPA better to consolidate its previously shaky rule, even if its support base is low. Its control of the major organisations of state with the exception of the Ministry of Finance remains firm especially with the additional, largely undeclared revenues from the diamond mines. Its ideological stance of indigenisation, sovereignty and empowerment is at least clearly understood while that of the MDC is unclear, including its Jobs, Upliftment, Capital Investment and Ecology (JUICE) programme for growth. It remains susceptible to the charge repeated endlessly by its coalition 'partner' and the state-controlled media of being Western puppets. There is, however, an alternative scenario that both MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai and President Mugabe fear more the enemy within (that is, in their own parties) than that without. This might lead to possible realignments according to some. While some are sceptical about this, proponents point out that no-one is posing a way to unlock the process whereby a yes vote leads to the elections with little having changed and the supposedly democratic elements of the constitution have had no chance to bed in. The alternative therefore is an elite pact avoiding ructions within the parties giving that few actually really want elections anyway. …","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.131","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
"Has any Zimbabwean election ever solved anything?" "The problem is not the constitution but who counts the votes." (Local voices) (1)) 1. Introduction The recent overwhelming 'Yes' vote in the constitutional referendum on 16 March has led to two seemingly contradictory developments. The way has opened up for elections later in the year (the date has to be announced by 29 June), but it is unlikely that these will occur in a free and fair environment as demanded by the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and by international donors who may provide the funding. By law Zimbabwe has to have set an election date by the end of June 2013 and before such elections the regional body SADC insisted that there be a referendum on a new constitution as agreed in inter-party negotiations after 2008. This took place peacefully, although amid a wider climate of intimidation and arrests, (2)) and the electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour. (3)) The negotiations over the latter in the Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee (COPAC) have dragged on since 2009. Finally a draft constitution was agreed in mid-January 2013 with all parties making concessions at the last minute. The sticking points were choosing presidential running mates (a big problem for both Mugabe and Tsvangirai given faction fighting), devolution, a Constitutional Court, a National Prosecuting Authority separate from the partisan Attorney General, and reducing the powers of the executive. Many see the draft as very flawed but with little choice but to accept it. As things stand, if elections are not called in the first half of 2013 the government becomes ultra vires. (4)) There has always been a tendency in ZANU-PF to maintain the semblance of legality (even if post-hoc on occasion) despite its methods. There has been no significant progress towards security reforms/governance to prevent the violence of the 2008 elections being repeated or other reforms to ensure a free(ish) and fair(ish) election such as a truly autonomous electoral commission (ZEC) and reform of the degraded voters roll. Legislation to establish a Human Rights Commission passed through Parliament but its provisions on impunity for abuses until recently attracted much civil society criticism. Western donors seem very keen to re-engage Harare despite the volatile human rights situation. In February 2013 we had four years of the 'Inclusive (or Unified) Government' (IG/GNU) following the signing in September 2008 of the 'Global Political Agreement' (GPA) between the former sole ruling party ZANU-PF and its challengers, the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Many activists see that ZANU-PF has used the space of the GPA better to consolidate its previously shaky rule, even if its support base is low. Its control of the major organisations of state with the exception of the Ministry of Finance remains firm especially with the additional, largely undeclared revenues from the diamond mines. Its ideological stance of indigenisation, sovereignty and empowerment is at least clearly understood while that of the MDC is unclear, including its Jobs, Upliftment, Capital Investment and Ecology (JUICE) programme for growth. It remains susceptible to the charge repeated endlessly by its coalition 'partner' and the state-controlled media of being Western puppets. There is, however, an alternative scenario that both MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai and President Mugabe fear more the enemy within (that is, in their own parties) than that without. This might lead to possible realignments according to some. While some are sceptical about this, proponents point out that no-one is posing a way to unlock the process whereby a yes vote leads to the elections with little having changed and the supposedly democratic elements of the constitution have had no chance to bed in. The alternative therefore is an elite pact avoiding ructions within the parties giving that few actually really want elections anyway. …