ZIMBABWE BETWEEN THE REFERENDUM AND THE ELECTIONS

IF 0.3 Q4 POLITICAL SCIENCE
S. Kibble
{"title":"ZIMBABWE BETWEEN THE REFERENDUM AND THE ELECTIONS","authors":"S. Kibble","doi":"10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.131","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\"Has any Zimbabwean election ever solved anything?\" \"The problem is not the constitution but who counts the votes.\" (Local voices) (1)) 1. Introduction The recent overwhelming 'Yes' vote in the constitutional referendum on 16 March has led to two seemingly contradictory developments. The way has opened up for elections later in the year (the date has to be announced by 29 June), but it is unlikely that these will occur in a free and fair environment as demanded by the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and by international donors who may provide the funding. By law Zimbabwe has to have set an election date by the end of June 2013 and before such elections the regional body SADC insisted that there be a referendum on a new constitution as agreed in inter-party negotiations after 2008. This took place peacefully, although amid a wider climate of intimidation and arrests, (2)) and the electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour. (3)) The negotiations over the latter in the Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee (COPAC) have dragged on since 2009. Finally a draft constitution was agreed in mid-January 2013 with all parties making concessions at the last minute. The sticking points were choosing presidential running mates (a big problem for both Mugabe and Tsvangirai given faction fighting), devolution, a Constitutional Court, a National Prosecuting Authority separate from the partisan Attorney General, and reducing the powers of the executive. Many see the draft as very flawed but with little choice but to accept it. As things stand, if elections are not called in the first half of 2013 the government becomes ultra vires. (4)) There has always been a tendency in ZANU-PF to maintain the semblance of legality (even if post-hoc on occasion) despite its methods. There has been no significant progress towards security reforms/governance to prevent the violence of the 2008 elections being repeated or other reforms to ensure a free(ish) and fair(ish) election such as a truly autonomous electoral commission (ZEC) and reform of the degraded voters roll. Legislation to establish a Human Rights Commission passed through Parliament but its provisions on impunity for abuses until recently attracted much civil society criticism. Western donors seem very keen to re-engage Harare despite the volatile human rights situation. In February 2013 we had four years of the 'Inclusive (or Unified) Government' (IG/GNU) following the signing in September 2008 of the 'Global Political Agreement' (GPA) between the former sole ruling party ZANU-PF and its challengers, the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Many activists see that ZANU-PF has used the space of the GPA better to consolidate its previously shaky rule, even if its support base is low. Its control of the major organisations of state with the exception of the Ministry of Finance remains firm especially with the additional, largely undeclared revenues from the diamond mines. Its ideological stance of indigenisation, sovereignty and empowerment is at least clearly understood while that of the MDC is unclear, including its Jobs, Upliftment, Capital Investment and Ecology (JUICE) programme for growth. It remains susceptible to the charge repeated endlessly by its coalition 'partner' and the state-controlled media of being Western puppets. There is, however, an alternative scenario that both MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai and President Mugabe fear more the enemy within (that is, in their own parties) than that without. This might lead to possible realignments according to some. While some are sceptical about this, proponents point out that no-one is posing a way to unlock the process whereby a yes vote leads to the elections with little having changed and the supposedly democratic elements of the constitution have had no chance to bed in. The alternative therefore is an elite pact avoiding ructions within the parties giving that few actually really want elections anyway. …","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.131","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5

Abstract

"Has any Zimbabwean election ever solved anything?" "The problem is not the constitution but who counts the votes." (Local voices) (1)) 1. Introduction The recent overwhelming 'Yes' vote in the constitutional referendum on 16 March has led to two seemingly contradictory developments. The way has opened up for elections later in the year (the date has to be announced by 29 June), but it is unlikely that these will occur in a free and fair environment as demanded by the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and by international donors who may provide the funding. By law Zimbabwe has to have set an election date by the end of June 2013 and before such elections the regional body SADC insisted that there be a referendum on a new constitution as agreed in inter-party negotiations after 2008. This took place peacefully, although amid a wider climate of intimidation and arrests, (2)) and the electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour. (3)) The negotiations over the latter in the Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee (COPAC) have dragged on since 2009. Finally a draft constitution was agreed in mid-January 2013 with all parties making concessions at the last minute. The sticking points were choosing presidential running mates (a big problem for both Mugabe and Tsvangirai given faction fighting), devolution, a Constitutional Court, a National Prosecuting Authority separate from the partisan Attorney General, and reducing the powers of the executive. Many see the draft as very flawed but with little choice but to accept it. As things stand, if elections are not called in the first half of 2013 the government becomes ultra vires. (4)) There has always been a tendency in ZANU-PF to maintain the semblance of legality (even if post-hoc on occasion) despite its methods. There has been no significant progress towards security reforms/governance to prevent the violence of the 2008 elections being repeated or other reforms to ensure a free(ish) and fair(ish) election such as a truly autonomous electoral commission (ZEC) and reform of the degraded voters roll. Legislation to establish a Human Rights Commission passed through Parliament but its provisions on impunity for abuses until recently attracted much civil society criticism. Western donors seem very keen to re-engage Harare despite the volatile human rights situation. In February 2013 we had four years of the 'Inclusive (or Unified) Government' (IG/GNU) following the signing in September 2008 of the 'Global Political Agreement' (GPA) between the former sole ruling party ZANU-PF and its challengers, the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Many activists see that ZANU-PF has used the space of the GPA better to consolidate its previously shaky rule, even if its support base is low. Its control of the major organisations of state with the exception of the Ministry of Finance remains firm especially with the additional, largely undeclared revenues from the diamond mines. Its ideological stance of indigenisation, sovereignty and empowerment is at least clearly understood while that of the MDC is unclear, including its Jobs, Upliftment, Capital Investment and Ecology (JUICE) programme for growth. It remains susceptible to the charge repeated endlessly by its coalition 'partner' and the state-controlled media of being Western puppets. There is, however, an alternative scenario that both MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai and President Mugabe fear more the enemy within (that is, in their own parties) than that without. This might lead to possible realignments according to some. While some are sceptical about this, proponents point out that no-one is posing a way to unlock the process whereby a yes vote leads to the elections with little having changed and the supposedly democratic elements of the constitution have had no chance to bed in. The alternative therefore is an elite pact avoiding ructions within the parties giving that few actually really want elections anyway. …
津巴布韦在全民公决和选举之间
“津巴布韦的选举解决了什么问题吗?”“问题不在于宪法,而在于谁计票。”(当地声音)(1))1。引言最近在3月16日的宪法公投中以压倒性的“赞成”票导致了两个看似矛盾的事态发展。今年晚些时候的选举已经开辟了道路(日期必须在6月29日之前宣布),但这些选举不太可能像区域机构南部非洲发展共同体(南共体)和可能提供资金的国际捐助者所要求的那样,在自由和公平的环境中进行。根据法律规定,津巴布韦必须在2013年6月底之前确定选举日期,在选举之前,地区机构南共体坚持要求根据2008年后政党间谈判达成的协议,就新宪法举行全民公投。这是和平进行的,尽管在更广泛的恐吓和逮捕气氛中,(2)),选民以压倒性多数投了赞成票。(3) 自2009年以来,议会宪法特别委员会(COPAC)关于后者的谈判一直在拖延。最终,2013年1月中旬达成了宪法草案,各方在最后一刻做出了让步。症结在于选择总统竞选伙伴(考虑到派系斗争,这对穆加贝和茨万吉拉伊来说都是一个大问题)、权力下放、宪法法院、独立于党派总检察长的国家检察机关,以及减少行政部门的权力。许多人认为该草案存在很大缺陷,但别无选择,只能接受。就目前情况来看,如果2013年上半年不举行选举,政府将越权。(4) )非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线一直有一种趋势,即尽管其方法是临时的,但仍保持合法性的表面。在安全改革/治理方面没有取得重大进展,以防止2008年选举的暴力事件再次发生,也没有进行其他改革,以确保自由和公平的选举,如真正自治的选举委员会和降级选民名单的改革。议会通过了设立人权委员会的立法,但其关于虐待行为不受惩罚的规定直到最近才引起民间社会的大量批评。尽管人权状况不稳定,但西方捐助者似乎非常渴望与哈拉雷重新接触。2013年2月,在前唯一执政党非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线与其挑战者民主变革运动(MDC)的两个派系于2008年9月签署“全球政治协议”(GPA)后,我们迎来了四年的“包容性(或统一)政府”(IG/GU)。许多活动人士认为,ZANU-PF更好地利用了GPA的空间来巩固其以前摇摇欲坠的统治,即使其支持率很低。除财政部外,它对主要国家组织的控制仍然稳固,尤其是钻石矿的额外收入基本上未申报。其本土化、主权和赋权的意识形态立场至少得到了明确的理解,而民主变革运动的意识形态立场则不明确,包括其就业、提升、资本投资和生态(JUICE)增长计划。它仍然容易受到其联盟“伙伴”和国家控制的媒体无休止重复的西方傀儡指控的影响。然而,还有一种替代方案,即MDC-T领导人摩根·茨万吉拉伊和穆加贝总统都更害怕内部(即他们自己政党中)的敌人,而不是外部。一些人认为,这可能会导致重新调整。尽管一些人对此持怀疑态度,但支持者指出,没有人提出一种方法来开启这一进程,即投赞成票导致选举几乎没有变化,宪法中所谓的民主元素也没有机会融入其中。因此,另一种选择是达成一项精英协议,避免党内的争吵,因为实际上很少有人真正想要选举…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
29
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信