The unchosen ones: Diaspora, nation, and migration in Israel and Germany

Abstract

had been encouraged. SOD (an unfortunate acronym in English) was in effect the application of systems theories to operational art that supposedly reconstituted the challenges facing a field commander as the battlefield environment developed (p. 166–67). What this meant in practice was anybody’s guess but, as Marcus notes, this underscored confused decisionmaking and blurred policy objectives that hardly helped Israel prosecute the 2006 war. Like the United States and its coalition allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not clear if the IDF still has the ability, let alone the political will, to place sufficient soldiers in harm’s way in pursuit of a proportionate response to threats posed by a powerfully armed militia. Marcus has given us a clear road map as to “why” the IDF arrived at this juncture. Whether it can ever leverage its undoubted technological superiority to subjugate Hezbollah, or whether it risks “another missed opportunity” by over-reliance on technical means remains to be seen. The danger exists, however, that in asking all the right questions, the hierarchy of the IDF might still be seeking all the wrong answers.