{"title":"Aquifers and Democracy: Enforcing Voter Equal Protection to Save California’s Imperiled Groundwater and Redeem Local Government","authors":"L. Dyble","doi":"10.15779/Z386M33383","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (“SGMA”) allows local entities that represent landowners, government agencies, or private companies rather than the public to take on exclusive power to regulate and manage imperiled groundwater resources. In at least some cases, the ways in which these entities are governed and controlled violates the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, and even the requirement that local government representational structures have a rational basis. SGMA attempts to address a longstanding gap in California water regulation, the consequences of which have culminated in a statewide crisis. Despite its importance to the future of the state’s economy and environment, the law’s implications for democracy have largely been ignored. This note examines the ways in which SMGA invokes Fourteenth Amendment, and specifically, requirements for proportional representation in local government established by Avery v. Midland County and Board of Estimate v. Morris. It argues that voter accountability and proportional representation in groundwater governance are important to actually achieving the ultimate goal of the legislation: effective management and regulation of critically imperiled common pool resources in California. It also contributes to solving a bigger problem. Special districts comprise the most numerous sector of American government, with policy-making and administrative responsibility for vital environmental resources, infrastructure, and services. Better enforcement of the one-person, one-vote requirement in this sector will promote accountability and equity in local government throughout the United States.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"105 1","pages":"1471"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2017-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"California Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z386M33383","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (“SGMA”) allows local entities that represent landowners, government agencies, or private companies rather than the public to take on exclusive power to regulate and manage imperiled groundwater resources. In at least some cases, the ways in which these entities are governed and controlled violates the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, and even the requirement that local government representational structures have a rational basis. SGMA attempts to address a longstanding gap in California water regulation, the consequences of which have culminated in a statewide crisis. Despite its importance to the future of the state’s economy and environment, the law’s implications for democracy have largely been ignored. This note examines the ways in which SMGA invokes Fourteenth Amendment, and specifically, requirements for proportional representation in local government established by Avery v. Midland County and Board of Estimate v. Morris. It argues that voter accountability and proportional representation in groundwater governance are important to actually achieving the ultimate goal of the legislation: effective management and regulation of critically imperiled common pool resources in California. It also contributes to solving a bigger problem. Special districts comprise the most numerous sector of American government, with policy-making and administrative responsibility for vital environmental resources, infrastructure, and services. Better enforcement of the one-person, one-vote requirement in this sector will promote accountability and equity in local government throughout the United States.
加利福尼亚州的《可持续地下水管理法》(“SGMA”)允许代表土地所有者、政府机构或私营公司而非公众的地方实体拥有监管和管理濒危地下水资源的专属权力。至少在某些情况下,这些实体的治理和控制方式违反了《平等保护条款》的一人一票要求,甚至违反了地方政府代表结构有合理基础的要求。SGMA试图解决加州水监管中长期存在的缺口,其后果已导致全州范围的危机。尽管该法律对该州经济和环境的未来很重要,但它对民主的影响在很大程度上被忽视了。本说明审查了SMGA援引第十四修正案的方式,特别是Avery诉Midland County和Board of Estimate诉Morris确立的地方政府比例代表制要求。它认为,选民问责制和地下水治理中的比例代表制对于实际实现立法的最终目标很重要:有效管理和监管加州严重濒危的公共水池资源。它也有助于解决更大的问题。特区是美国政府中数量最多的部门,对重要的环境资源、基础设施和服务负有决策和行政责任。在该行业更好地执行一人一票的要求,将促进美国各地地方政府的问责制和公平性。
期刊介绍:
This review essay considers the state of hybrid democracy in California through an examination of three worthy books: Daniel Weintraub, Party of One: Arnold Schwarzenegger and the Rise of the Independent Voter; Center for Governmental Studies, Democracy by Initiative: Shaping California"s Fourth Branch of Government (Second Edition), and Mark Baldassare and Cheryl Katz, The Coming of Age of Direct Democracy: California"s Recall and Beyond. The essay concludes that despite the hoopla about Governor Schwarzenegger as a "party of one" and a new age of "hybrid democracy" in California.