C. L. Boyd, R. Carlos, Margaret H. Taylor, Matthew E. Baker, Elise Blasingame
{"title":"Congressional Constraint? The Review of In Absentia Immigration Removal Orders in Federal Circuit Courts","authors":"C. L. Boyd, R. Carlos, Margaret H. Taylor, Matthew E. Baker, Elise Blasingame","doi":"10.1177/10659129231164947","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Within the politically charged immigration system in the United States, Congress mandates the entry of in absentia removal orders against immigrants who fail to appear for immigration court hearings. Statutory guidance similarly constrains the ability of appellate courts to overturn those in absentia orders. In this article, we examine how federal circuit court judges make decisions in the review of in absentia orders when faced with discretion-revoking congressional statutory language pitted against a highly politicized area of law where policy preferences sit at the forefront of judges’ minds. Using an original dataset of U.S. Courts of Appeals cases decided from 2001 to 2020, we find that pro-immigrant decisions are rare, as intended by the governing statute. We also find, however, that judicial policy preferences predict the degree to which federal judges support the petitioning immigrant through statutory factors related to the adequacy of government notice and the presence of exceptional circumstances to justify nonappearance.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Research Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231164947","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Within the politically charged immigration system in the United States, Congress mandates the entry of in absentia removal orders against immigrants who fail to appear for immigration court hearings. Statutory guidance similarly constrains the ability of appellate courts to overturn those in absentia orders. In this article, we examine how federal circuit court judges make decisions in the review of in absentia orders when faced with discretion-revoking congressional statutory language pitted against a highly politicized area of law where policy preferences sit at the forefront of judges’ minds. Using an original dataset of U.S. Courts of Appeals cases decided from 2001 to 2020, we find that pro-immigrant decisions are rare, as intended by the governing statute. We also find, however, that judicial policy preferences predict the degree to which federal judges support the petitioning immigrant through statutory factors related to the adequacy of government notice and the presence of exceptional circumstances to justify nonappearance.
期刊介绍:
Political Research Quarterly (PRQ) is the official journal of the Western Political Science Association. PRQ seeks to publish scholarly research of exceptionally high merit that makes notable contributions in any subfield of political science. The editors especially encourage submissions that employ a mixture of theoretical approaches or multiple methodologies to address major political problems or puzzles at a local, national, or global level. Collections of articles on a common theme or debate, to be published as short symposia, are welcome as well as individual submissions.