{"title":"Cryptojacking injection: A paradigm shift to cryptocurrency-based web-centric internet attacks","authors":"Aaron Zimba, Zhaoshun Wang, Mwenge Mulenga","doi":"10.1080/10919392.2019.1552747","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Crypto-mining attacks have emerged as a new generation of web-based attacks which have seen cybercriminals eschew the infamous crypto ransomware. The watering hole attack vector has by far been the most widely employed attack methodology but it faces the task of luring the victim to the infected web resources. However, cryptojacking injection presents a paradigm shift to web-based crypto-mining attacks in that it eliminates the need for a pivotal third-party such as the exploitable web server. Thus, instead of attacking credit card and other private information of e-commerce users, attackers seek to maliciously abuse a victim’s CPU to generate cryptocurrency. In this paper, we investigate and evaluate cryptojacking injection – a state-of-the-art web-centric attack vector in the crypto-mining attacks landscape. We formulate an attack model based on finite state machines which depicts the various breaches of confidentiality, integrity and availability in the web system as the attack progresses. We show how this new attack vector attacks some of the core components of e-commerce (URL, HTTP and HTML) to generate Monero crypto currency from benign web users. We evaluate our modeling approach with a series of experiments with two attack scenarios using different operating systems. Results show that the attack is indeed cross-platform and feasible on any operating system of a browser-capable device. We analyze the generated network traffic during the attack and draw features such as URLs and the parsed files, the associated cryptographic hashes, and the IP addresses of the crypto-mining domains. These, together with host-based features such as exhaustive CPU usage can be used as indicators of compromise and subsequently act as feed into intrusion detection systems.","PeriodicalId":54777,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce","volume":"29 1","pages":"40 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10919392.2019.1552747","citationCount":"14","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10919392.2019.1552747","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Abstract
ABSTRACT Crypto-mining attacks have emerged as a new generation of web-based attacks which have seen cybercriminals eschew the infamous crypto ransomware. The watering hole attack vector has by far been the most widely employed attack methodology but it faces the task of luring the victim to the infected web resources. However, cryptojacking injection presents a paradigm shift to web-based crypto-mining attacks in that it eliminates the need for a pivotal third-party such as the exploitable web server. Thus, instead of attacking credit card and other private information of e-commerce users, attackers seek to maliciously abuse a victim’s CPU to generate cryptocurrency. In this paper, we investigate and evaluate cryptojacking injection – a state-of-the-art web-centric attack vector in the crypto-mining attacks landscape. We formulate an attack model based on finite state machines which depicts the various breaches of confidentiality, integrity and availability in the web system as the attack progresses. We show how this new attack vector attacks some of the core components of e-commerce (URL, HTTP and HTML) to generate Monero crypto currency from benign web users. We evaluate our modeling approach with a series of experiments with two attack scenarios using different operating systems. Results show that the attack is indeed cross-platform and feasible on any operating system of a browser-capable device. We analyze the generated network traffic during the attack and draw features such as URLs and the parsed files, the associated cryptographic hashes, and the IP addresses of the crypto-mining domains. These, together with host-based features such as exhaustive CPU usage can be used as indicators of compromise and subsequently act as feed into intrusion detection systems.
期刊介绍:
The aim of the Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce (JOCEC) is to publish quality, fresh, and innovative work that will make a difference for future research and practice rather than focusing on well-established research areas.
JOCEC publishes original research that explores the relationships between computer/communication technology and the design, operations, and performance of organizations. This includes implications of the technologies for organizational structure and dynamics, technological advances to keep pace with changes of organizations and their environments, emerging technological possibilities for improving organizational performance, and the many facets of electronic business.
Theoretical, experimental, survey, and design science research are all welcome and might look at:
• E-commerce
• Collaborative commerce
• Interorganizational systems
• Enterprise systems
• Supply chain technologies
• Computer-supported cooperative work
• Computer-aided coordination
• Economics of organizational computing
• Technologies for organizational learning
• Behavioral aspects of organizational computing.