Pascal Wagner-Egger, Daniel de Oliveira Fernandes, Joana Carrel, S. Delouvée
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract: Introduction: Conspiracy believers often claim that they believe in conspiracy theories not on irrational grounds, as scholars often argue, but because of the real scandals and real conspiracies that have occurred in history. Methods: We tested whether reminding people of real scandals in the political, economic, or scientific domain and exposition to invented scandals (i.e., that did not occur) increase beliefs in conspiracy theories. A secondary research question was whether conspiracy beliefs positively relate to differentiating between real and invented scandals. Results: Our results showed that reminding people of real scandals and exposing them to invented scandals did not affect their conspiracy beliefs. Higher conspiracy believers were slightly better than lower conspiracy believers at recognizing invented scandals but somewhat worse at recognizing real scandals. Participants from left-wing political orientation were also marginally better than those with right-wing orientation at identifying real scandals. Discussion/conclusion: Reminding people of real and invented scandals did not have a short-term effect on conspiracist beliefs. This article supports the argument that conspiracy theories are not helpful for social critique, as higher believers in conspiracy theories were not better than lower believers at recognizing actual scandals.