{"title":"Applying History in Real Time","authors":"N. Ferguson","doi":"10.1163/25895893-bja10021","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Policymakers generally have at least some historical assumptions, even if they have not been trained as historians. Often, these assumptions play a critical part in decision-making, especially in times of crisis. This article compares the reactions of George W. Bush’s administration to two epoch-making events: the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001 and the “9/15” bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. I argue that historical analogies played a key role in the debates between officials about how to respond to the two crises. However, the two sets of decision-makers inhabited different conceptual worlds. Those concerned with national security in 2001 thought differently about risk from those concerned with financial stability in 2008. This meant that they applied history to the crises they confronted with differing degrees of success.","PeriodicalId":93113,"journal":{"name":"Journal of applied history","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of applied history","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/25895893-bja10021","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Policymakers generally have at least some historical assumptions, even if they have not been trained as historians. Often, these assumptions play a critical part in decision-making, especially in times of crisis. This article compares the reactions of George W. Bush’s administration to two epoch-making events: the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001 and the “9/15” bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. I argue that historical analogies played a key role in the debates between officials about how to respond to the two crises. However, the two sets of decision-makers inhabited different conceptual worlds. Those concerned with national security in 2001 thought differently about risk from those concerned with financial stability in 2008. This meant that they applied history to the crises they confronted with differing degrees of success.