Guided by Joy: Becoming-Active in Deleuze’s Spinoza

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Eric Aldieri
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Abstract

Spinoza’s Ethics makes reference to three kinds of knowledge that humans are capable of winning: imagination, reason and intuitive knowledge of God. Of these, imagination is necessarily inadequate while the latter two are necessarily adequate. In other words, we remain passive in the first type of knowledge, but come into our power of acting in the latter two. The passage from the first to the second and third types of knowledge, however, remains, in Spinoza’s text, rather obscure. This paper seeks to come to terms with how exactly the passage from passion to action is made in the Ethics while locating this particular problematic as a site at which various interpretations of Spinoza diverge with considerable stakes. I thus focus on Gilles Deleuze’s proposed answer to this problem as well as Pierre Macherey’s critique of Deleuze’s reading. I argue that the disagreement between Macherey and Deleuze is not merely interpretive, but rather indicates some of the stakes involved in assessing Spinoza’s theory of the passions and the imagination. An ‘optimistic’ appraisal of these features might lead one to Deleuze’s affirmationist project, while Macherey’s pessimism concerning the two might take a Spinozist politics in quite the opposite direction. I appreciate and assess multiple aspects of Macherey’s critique while nonetheless arguing that they do not prove damning for Deleuze’s affirmationist picture. I conclude with an analysis of vacillation of mind in Deleuze’s Spinoza, and place Deleuze’s thoughts on this note in conversation with his earlier reading of Nietzsche.
快乐引导:德勒兹《斯宾诺莎》的活跃
斯宾诺莎的《伦理学》提到了人类能够赢得的三种知识:想象、理性和对上帝的直观认识。其中,想象力是必然不足的,而后两者是必然充足的。换句话说,我们在第一种知识中仍然是被动的,但在后两种知识中,我们获得了行动的力量。然而,从第一种到第二种和第三种知识的过渡,在斯宾诺莎的文本中,仍然相当模糊。本文试图就《伦理学》中从激情到行动的过渡究竟是如何形成的达成协议,同时将这一特殊问题定位为对斯宾诺莎的各种解释产生重大分歧的地方。因此,我将重点讨论吉尔·德勒兹对这个问题提出的答案,以及皮埃尔·马赫里对德勒兹阅读的批评。我认为,马赫里和德勒兹之间的分歧不仅仅是解释性的,而是表明了在评估斯宾诺莎的激情和想象理论时所涉及的一些利害关系。对这些特征的“乐观”评价可能会导致德勒兹的肯定主义计划,而马赫里关于这两者的悲观主义可能会把斯宾诺莎的政治带向完全相反的方向。我欣赏和评价马赫雷批判的多个方面,尽管如此,我认为他们并没有证明德勒兹的肯定主义图景是有罪的。最后,我分析了德勒兹的《斯宾诺莎》中思想的摇摆,并将德勒兹的思想与他早期对尼采的解读进行了对话。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
38
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