The Effect of Referendums on Autocratic Survival: Running Alone and Not Finishing Second

IF 2.9 2区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Alberto Penadés, S. Velasco
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Dictatorships that use plebiscites – that is, referendums initiated by the executive – have a longer expected lifespan. A successful plebiscite sends a signal that makes coordination for collective action more difficult and induces the falsification of preferences. It also enhances the status of the dictator within the regime and against potential rivals through the use of agenda power. As a result, plebiscites are followed by decreased mobilization and a reduced risk of palace coups. This, in turn, adds years to the dictator's tenure. We have found evidence to support these propositions by utilizing data from various databases of autocratic regimes that span from 1946 to 2008.
公投对专制国家生存的影响:单打独斗不屈居亚军
使用公民投票的独裁政权——也就是由行政部门发起的公民投票——预期寿命更长。公民投票的成功发出了一个信号,使集体行动的协调更加困难,并导致偏好的伪造。它还提高了独裁者在政权内部的地位,并通过使用议程权力对抗潜在对手。因此,公民投票之后,动员减少,宫廷政变的风险降低。这反过来又为独裁者的任期增加了几年。我们利用1946年至2008年独裁政权的各种数据库中的数据,找到了支持这些主张的证据。
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来源期刊
Government and Opposition
Government and Opposition POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
6.70
自引率
10.70%
发文量
49
期刊介绍: Government and Opposition has been a leading international journal of comparative politics for over 40 years. Its distinctive voice amongst politics journals has ensured a large, worldwide circulation. Government and Opposition"s interests include: - developments in the theory and practice of democracy, including significant elections the evolution of political parties, and the consequences of new political challenges for governments and oppositions - the governance of the global economy and the implications of interdependence worldwide politics - including the politics of the European Union - major issues of public policy, especially from a comparative perspective theoretical and ethical dimensions of political issues and policy.
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