Social ties and citizen-initiated contacts: the case of china’s local one-stop governments

IF 2.4 3区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Youlang Zhang, Xufeng Zhu
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Abstract Citizen-initiated contacts with the government considerably influence the outcomes of public management. Nevertheless, the following question remains inadequately explored and explained: Why are some citizens more likely to initiate contact with the government than others? This study examines how two distinct types of social ties, namely, daily and political ties, influence citizen contacting. We point out that daily and political ties can generally help reduce the information constraints involved in citizen contacting. Particularly, political ties may also increase citizens’ civic skills and capability to punish unresponsive government officials. We use original data from a nationally representative survey conducted in China in 2015 to verify our expectations. We find that citizens with strong political ties are significantly likely to initiate contact with local one-stop governments. Although consistently positive, the effects of daily ties are not statistically significant and tend to be smaller than the effects of political ties.
社会联系与公民主动接触:以中国地方一站式政府为例
由公民发起的与政府的接触对公共管理的结果有很大的影响。然而,以下问题仍然没有得到充分的探讨和解释:为什么有些公民比其他人更有可能主动与政府接触?本研究探讨两种不同类型的社会关系,即日常关系和政治关系,如何影响公民接触。我们指出,日常和政治关系通常有助于减少公民接触所涉及的信息约束。特别是,政治关系还可能提高公民的公民技能和惩罚反应迟钝的政府官员的能力。我们使用了2015年在中国进行的具有全国代表性的调查的原始数据来验证我们的预期。我们发现,具有强大政治关系的公民极有可能主动与当地一站式政府接触。虽然一直是积极的,但日常联系的影响在统计上并不显著,而且往往比政治关系的影响要小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.40
自引率
6.70%
发文量
9
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