The role of information asymmetry in closely-held firms’ tax and financial reporting choices

IF 2 4区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Hong Fan, Amin Mawani, Liqiang Chen
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This study examines whether and how closely-held ownership is associated with the relationship between tax and financial reporting aggressiveness. More specifically, we find that although both closely-held and widely-held firms pursue tax savings and higher reported earnings, closely-held firms are less aggressive compared to widely-held firms in pursuing both simultaneously. We argue and find evidence that this is associated with non-controlling shareholders and controlling shareholders concerned about agency costs imposed by each on the other. Furthermore, this finding is driven mainly by firms with high information asymmetry (as proxied by firm size, analyst following and board size), suggesting that information asymmetry is a channel through which closely-held ownership is associated with firms’ tax and financial reporting choices.
信息不对称在控股公司税务和财务报告选择中的作用
本研究考察了持股是否以及持股与税务和财务报告积极性之间的关系有多密切。更具体地说,我们发现,尽管紧密持股和广泛持股的公司都追求节税和更高的报告收益,但与广泛持股的企业相比,紧密持股的公司在同时追求这两个目标方面没有那么积极。我们认为并发现证据表明,这与非控股股东和控股股东对各自强加给对方的代理成本的担忧有关。此外,这一发现主要是由具有高度信息不对称性的公司驱动的(以公司规模、分析师追随和董事会规模为代表),这表明信息不对称是一种渠道,通过这种渠道,紧密持股与公司的税务和财务报告选择相关联。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
11.80%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Accounting and Business Research publishes papers containing a substantial and original contribution to knowledge. Papers may cover any area of accounting, broadly defined and including corporate governance, auditing and taxation. However the focus must be accounting, rather than (corporate) finance or general management. Authors may take a theoretical or an empirical approach, using either quantitative or qualitative methods. They may aim to contribute to developing and understanding the role of accounting in business. Papers should be rigorous but also written in a way that makes them intelligible to a wide range of academics and, where appropriate, practitioners.
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