{"title":"The role of information asymmetry in closely-held firms’ tax and financial reporting choices","authors":"Hong Fan, Amin Mawani, Liqiang Chen","doi":"10.1080/00014788.2021.1986366","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether and how closely-held ownership is associated with the relationship between tax and financial reporting aggressiveness. More specifically, we find that although both closely-held and widely-held firms pursue tax savings and higher reported earnings, closely-held firms are less aggressive compared to widely-held firms in pursuing both simultaneously. We argue and find evidence that this is associated with non-controlling shareholders and controlling shareholders concerned about agency costs imposed by each on the other. Furthermore, this finding is driven mainly by firms with high information asymmetry (as proxied by firm size, analyst following and board size), suggesting that information asymmetry is a channel through which closely-held ownership is associated with firms’ tax and financial reporting choices.","PeriodicalId":7054,"journal":{"name":"Accounting and Business Research","volume":"53 1","pages":"185 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounting and Business Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2021.1986366","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
This study examines whether and how closely-held ownership is associated with the relationship between tax and financial reporting aggressiveness. More specifically, we find that although both closely-held and widely-held firms pursue tax savings and higher reported earnings, closely-held firms are less aggressive compared to widely-held firms in pursuing both simultaneously. We argue and find evidence that this is associated with non-controlling shareholders and controlling shareholders concerned about agency costs imposed by each on the other. Furthermore, this finding is driven mainly by firms with high information asymmetry (as proxied by firm size, analyst following and board size), suggesting that information asymmetry is a channel through which closely-held ownership is associated with firms’ tax and financial reporting choices.
期刊介绍:
Accounting and Business Research publishes papers containing a substantial and original contribution to knowledge. Papers may cover any area of accounting, broadly defined and including corporate governance, auditing and taxation. However the focus must be accounting, rather than (corporate) finance or general management. Authors may take a theoretical or an empirical approach, using either quantitative or qualitative methods. They may aim to contribute to developing and understanding the role of accounting in business. Papers should be rigorous but also written in a way that makes them intelligible to a wide range of academics and, where appropriate, practitioners.