Limiting Cases of Modal Modification: Reply to Kosterec

IF 0.3 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Organon F Pub Date : 2020-08-06 DOI:10.31577/orgf.2020.27307

Bjørn Jespersen

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Kosterec (2019) points out that my current theory of modal modifiers cannot deal satisfactorily with limiting cases. This note solves the problem. The form of the solution is to leave the existing theory as is and instead add a clause handling the limiting case which Kosterec brings up and another clause handling the limiting case at the other end of the spectrum. My theory of modal modifiers, as set out in (2013), works well, as long as the argument property being modified is either (i) a purely contingent property or (ii) a contingent property with an essential core, provided the resulting modified property (MF) is not applied to an element of the essential core of F.1 To stick with the original example of mine that Kosterec takes over, we treat this predication as a datum:

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情态修饰的极限情况:回复Kosterec

Kosterec（2019）指出，我目前的模态修饰语理论不能令人满意地处理极限情况。此注释解决了问题。解决方案的形式是保持现有理论的原样，而是添加一个处理Kosterec提出的限制情况的条款，以及另一个处理光谱另一端的限制情况。我的模态修饰符理论，如（2013）所述，只要被修改的自变量性质是（i）纯或有性质或（ii）具有本质核心的或有性质，只要得到的修改性质（MF）不应用于F.1的本质核心元素，就可以很好地工作，我们将此预测视为一个基准：

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Organon F PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

20.00%

发文量

审稿时长

38 weeks

期刊介绍： Organon F publishes high-quality articles on the entire range of topics discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Accordingly, we invite authors to submit articles that address issues that belong, but are not limited, to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical logic. We also consider analytically written articles on ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, political philosophy and history of philosophy. The principal aim is to publish original articles that meet the standards typical of analytic philosophy, primarily those of conceptual clarity, precision and soundness of argumentation.