Rational choice theory and demand for petty corruption

IF 1.6 Q3 BUSINESS

Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research Pub Date : 2018-11-19 DOI:10.15549/JEECAR.V5I2.219

Javlon Juraev

引用次数: 4

Abstract

This article studies corruption as a rational choice phenomenon. Unlike the widespread game-theory approach to explaining corrupt behaviour, this article attempts to describe corruption as continuous utility-maximizing problem. It comes up with a demand for corruption function, which shows how the readiness of a rational person to accept corrupt income depends on several factors such as official wage rate, severity of punishment, awareness of those penalties, probability of being detected and probability of being prosecuted.

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理性选择理论与小额腐败的需求

本文将腐败作为一种理性选择现象进行研究。与解释腐败行为的广泛博弈论方法不同，本文试图将腐败描述为持续的效用最大化问题。它提出了对腐败功能的需求，这表明一个理性的人接受腐败收入的意愿如何取决于几个因素，如官方工资率、惩罚的严重程度、对这些惩罚的认识、被发现的概率和被起诉的概率。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics and Econometrics

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

43.80%

发文量

审稿时长

8 weeks

期刊介绍： Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research (JEECAR) is a multi-disciplinary journal related to the Eurasia regional economics, finance, management, marketing, international affairs, and other business-related disciplines. By Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the IEECA refers to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and five post-Soviet Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The JEECAR Journal is committed to the editorial principles of all aspects of publication ethics and publication malpractice as assigned by the Committee on Public Ethics. Any paper submitted to the journal must be original, previously unpublished, and currently not under consideration for publication elsewhere. All articles in the printed version of the journal are peer-reviewed. The review process is a double-blind process. Neither the authors nor the reviewers know who wrote or reviewed the article. Per standard practice, only the Editor assigned to handle a paper knows the identity of the authors and the reviewers.