Enkratic Rationality Is Instrumental Rationality *

IF 1.6 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Wooram Lee
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Abstract

You are irrational in a distinctive way if you fail to intend to do what you believe you ought to do, such as when you believe that you ought to work on your paper but end up watching your favorite TV show, or when you believe you ought not to drink and yet pick up another tempting glass of wine: you are akratic. It seems as if two different parts of your mind fail to cohere with each other: one part tells you (not) to do something, but the other part resists. Since being in such a state of mind seems to be a distinctive form of rational failure, it has been widely held that there is a principle of rationality, “Enkrasia”, which requires you not to be akratic. However, the nature of Enkrasia yet remains unclear. Although akratic irrationality intuitively involves incoherence of some sort, Enkrasia seems importantly dissimilar from other principles of coherence, as a number of writers point out (Broome 2013, Reisner 2013, Worsnip 2018). Broome (2013: 174) writes, for example, “[intending] what you believe you ought seems very different from not having contradictory beliefs, or intending what you believe is a means implied by an end that you intend, or satisfying other requirements of rationality.” My aim in this paper is to offer a novel view of the nature of Enkrasia, according to which it is not an independent principle of rationality. Properly understood, Enkrasia is simply an instance of instrumental rationality, which is a matter of intending what you believe to be the necessary means to an end you intend. I argue that believing, all-things-considered, that you ought to φ implies intending that you do what you ought to do out of a set of alternatives, of which φ-ing is an element. If so, the content of your belief that you ought to φ (out of those alternatives) can be seen as specifying the means to your end, i.e., doing what you ought to do. If so, when you intend to φ in accordance with your belief that you ought to φ, it can be seen as intending what you believe to be the means to your end.
论理性是工具理性*
如果你没有打算去做你认为自己应该做的事情,比如你认为自己应该写论文,但最后却在看自己最喜欢的电视节目,或者你认为自己不应该喝酒,但又拿起一杯诱人的葡萄酒,那么你就是不理智的。就好像你大脑的两个不同部分无法相互协调:一个部分告诉你(不要)做某事,但另一个部分抵制。由于处于这种精神状态似乎是理性失败的一种独特形式,因此人们普遍认为存在一种理性原则,即“Enkrasia”,它要求你不要变得akratic。然而,恩克拉西亚的性质仍然不清楚。尽管akratic非理性直观地涉及某种形式的不连贯,但正如许多作家指出的那样,Enkrasia似乎与其他连贯原则有重要的不同(Broome 2013, Reisner 2013, Worsnip 2018)。Broome(2013: 174)写道,例如,“(有意)你相信你应该做的事,似乎与没有矛盾的信念,或有意相信你所相信的是你所希望的目的所隐含的手段,或满足其他理性要求是非常不同的。”我在本文中的目的是提供一种关于恩克拉西亚本质的新观点,根据这种观点,它不是一个独立的理性原则。正确地理解,恩克拉西亚只是工具理性的一个例子,它是一种意图,你认为是达到你想要达到的目的的必要手段。我认为,考虑到所有事情,相信你应该φ意味着你打算在一系列选择中做你应该做的事,φ-ing是其中的一个要素。如果是这样的话,你相信你应该φ(在这些选择中)的内容可以被看作是指定达到你的目的的手段,也就是说,做你应该做的事。如果是这样,当你打算按照你应该做的信念去做φ时,就可以被看作是打算做你认为是达到你目的的手段。
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CiteScore
1.50
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