Audit Firm Ranking, Audit Quality and Audit Fees: Examining Conflicting Price Discrimination Views

Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei , Norman Mohd-Saleh , Kamran Ahmed
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引用次数: 24

Abstract

In this study, we examine whether highly ranked audit firms in Iran, as determined by the Securities and Exchange Organization (SEO), earn a fee premium, firstly, by providing superior quality audit services or, secondly, due to reputation created by the ranking system implemented by the SEO. We employ price discrimination theory, and we test quality discrimination versus brand reputation explanations in the context of a unique institutional setting (where international audit firms are not allowed to operate). The data are derived from firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period 2006 to 2015. Our results show that the quality of audit services (using all of our measures) provided by the highest ranked audit firms is not superior to that of the non-highest ranked firms. In addition, the audit fee models suggest that the highest ranked firms charge significantly more audit fees compared to lower ranked firms. We employ several sensitivity tests and the results do not change materially. Such findings go against the “quality-based price discrimination” view but support the reputation-based view, and make a significant contribution towards understanding the economic consequences of state-determined ranking of audit firms rather than allowing the market to determine quality differentiation.

审计事务所排名、审计质量与审计费用——对价格歧视观点冲突的考察
在本研究中,我们考察了由美国证券交易组织(SEO)确定的伊朗排名靠前的审计公司是否首先通过提供优质的审计服务或其次由于SEO实施的排名系统所创造的声誉而获得费用溢价。我们采用价格歧视理论,并在一个独特的制度环境(不允许国际审计公司经营)的背景下检验质量歧视与品牌声誉的解释。这些数据来自2006年至2015年在德黑兰证券交易所(TSE)上市的公司。我们的研究结果表明,排名最高的审计事务所提供的审计服务质量(使用我们所有的衡量标准)并不优于排名不高的审计事务所。此外,审计费用模型表明,排名最高的事务所收取的审计费用明显高于排名较低的事务所。我们进行了几次灵敏度测试,结果没有实质性的变化。这些发现与“基于质量的价格歧视”观点相悖,但支持基于声誉的观点,并对理解国家决定审计事务所排名的经济后果做出了重大贡献,而不是让市场决定质量差异。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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