Macroprudential Ideas and Auxiliary Change in Financial Governance Paradigm

IF 0.1 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Jaehwan Jung
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, some have referred to the macroprudential turn in global financial governance as a paradigm shift. However, this article argues that macroprudential ideas cannot be seen as a paradigm shift since macroprudential regulation supplements, rather than replaces, existing microprudential regulation. In this respect, it is more precise to conceptualize the macroprudential turn as “auxiliary change,” which means an incremental change brought about by adding auxiliary hypotheses while maintaining the hard-core assumptions of the existing policy paradigm. The hardcore assumptions of the financial governance paradigm are its ontology and epistemology, which stipulate what entities constitute financial markets and how actors understand the financial world surrounding them. Macroprudential ideas have not changed the core ontological and epistemological assumptions of microprudential ideas, that is, individualistic ontology and rationalistic epistemology. Rather, they have introduced auxiliary hypotheses, such as a fallacy of composition and bounded rationality, into the financial governance paradigm to explain a newly identified anomaly, namely, systemic risk. Diametrically opposed to the orthodox paradigm in terms of ontology and epistemology is what can be called “social constructivist ideas,” which are founded on sociological ontology and epistemology.
宏观审慎理念与金融治理范式的辅助变革
自2008年全球金融危机以来,一些人将全球金融治理的宏观审慎转向称为范式转变。然而,本文认为,宏观审慎的想法不能被视为范式的转变,因为宏观审慎监管补充,而不是取代,现有的微观审慎监管。在这方面,将宏观审慎转向概念化为“辅助变化”更为准确,这意味着在保持现有政策范式的核心假设的同时,通过增加辅助假设带来的增量变化。金融治理范式的核心假设是它的本体论和认识论,它们规定了什么实体构成了金融市场,以及参与者如何理解围绕它们的金融世界。宏观审慎思想并没有改变微观审慎思想的核心本体论和认识论假设,即个人主义本体论和理性主义认识论。相反,他们在金融治理范式中引入了辅助假设,如构成谬误和有限理性,以解释新发现的异常现象,即系统性风险。与本体论和认识论的正统范式截然相反的是建立在社会学本体论和认识论基础上的“社会建构主义思想”。
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来源期刊
Korean Journal of International Studies
Korean Journal of International Studies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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