Kreps & Scheinkman with Product Differentiation

IF 1.5 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Frontiers of Economics in China Pub Date : 2019-07-17 DOI:10.3868/S060-008-019-0011-4

Stephen Martin

引用次数: 1

Abstract

Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)'s celebrated result is that in a two-stage model of a market with homogeneous products in which firms noncooperatively pick capacities in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is that of a one-shot Cournot game. This note derives capacity best response functions for the first stage and extends the Kreps and Scheinkman result to the case of differentiated products.

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Kreps & Scheinkman与产品差异化

Kreps和Scheinkman（1983）的著名结果是，在具有同质产品的市场的两阶段模型中，企业在第一阶段非合作地选择产能，在第二阶段设定价格，均衡结果是一次古诺博弈。本注释推导了第一阶段的容量最佳响应函数，并将Kreps和Scheinkman结果扩展到差异化产品的情况。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Frontiers of Economics in China ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.20

自引率

0.00%

发文量

373

期刊介绍： Frontiers of Economics in China seeks to provide a forum for a broad blend of peer-reviewed academic papers of economics in order to promote communication and exchanges between economists in China and abroad. It will reflect the enormous advances that are currently being made in China in the field of economy and society. In addition, this journal also bears the mission of introducing the academic achievements on Chinese economics research to the world.