The Life-Cycle Model Implies that Most Young People Should Not Save for Retirement

Q4 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Jason S. Scott, J. Shoven, S. Slavov, John G. Watson
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Retirement policy is often predicated on the belief that more saving is always better, at least at the margin. This belief is used to justify the increasingly widespread practice of automatically enrolling workers in employer-sponsored defined contribution plans. However, the conclusion that individuals do not save optimally for retirement requires a benchmark for optimal behavior. A reasonable benchmark that is often used in the academic literature is the life-cycle model, in which rational individuals allocate resources over their lifetimes with the aim of avoiding sharp changes in their standard of living. We argue that, under realistic assumptions, the life-cycle model implies that most young people should not save for retirement. First, high-income workers tend to experience wage growth over their careers. For these workers, maintaining as steady a standard of living as possible therefore requires spending all income while young and only starting to save for retirement during middle age. Second, low-income workers, whose wage profiles tend to be flatter, receive high Social Security replacement rates, making optimal saving rates very low. Finally, for all workers, low real interest rates make a front-loaded lifetime spending profile optimal. We show that the welfare costs of automatically enrolling younger workers in defined contribution plans—if they are passive savers who do not opt out immediately—can be substantial, even with employer matching.
生命周期模型暗示大多数年轻人不应该为退休储蓄
退休政策往往基于这样一种信念:储蓄越多越好,至少在边际上是这样。这种信念被用来为越来越普遍的自动让工人参加雇主赞助的固定缴款计划的做法辩护。然而,得出个人没有为退休而进行最佳储蓄的结论需要一个最佳行为的基准。学术文献中经常使用的一个合理的基准是生命周期模型,在这个模型中,理性的个人在他们的一生中分配资源,目的是避免他们的生活水平发生急剧变化。我们认为,在现实的假设下,生命周期模型意味着大多数年轻人不应该为退休储蓄。首先,高收入工人在其职业生涯中往往会经历工资增长。因此,对于这些工人来说,保持尽可能稳定的生活水平需要在年轻时花掉所有收入,直到中年才开始为退休储蓄。其次,低收入工人的工资水平往往较低,他们的社会保障替代率很高,这使得最优储蓄率非常低。最后,对于所有工人来说,低实际利率使前期的终身消费状况最理想。我们的研究表明,自动将年轻员工纳入固定缴款计划(如果他们是被动储蓄者,不会立即选择退出)的福利成本可能是巨大的,即使有雇主匹配。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Retirement
Journal of Retirement Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Finance
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
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