Ronald Dworkin: Seeking Truth and Justice through Responsibility

IF 1.3 Q1 LAW
Laws Pub Date : 2023-04-28 DOI:10.3390/laws12030041
Samra Ibric
{"title":"Ronald Dworkin: Seeking Truth and Justice through Responsibility","authors":"Samra Ibric","doi":"10.3390/laws12030041","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to Dworkin, “truth” is an interpretative concept. Why? Moral judgements are often the subject of disagreement because they are often the result of divergent conceptual understandings. If, on the other hand, we want to interpret concepts correctly, we have to deal with the analysis of the underlying values we attach to these concepts. Dworkin understands the true as a matter of interpretation, which—and this is often misunderstood—is capable of producing a correct conception of the truth. The truth is thereby directly related to justice. Dworkin even ties his theory of interpretation to an objective truth that can only produce conclusive reasons for a specific advocacy of a particular position in an argument after responsible and intensive debate—in the sense of his two-stage theory. In fact, it turns out that Dworkin’s search for and conception of an objective truth describes a (historical) process. We interpret what our ancestors have already interpreted and continue to understand (in a modified way). This reflexive responsibility is ours to bear; according to Dworkin, it is our responsibility to always stand up for truth through good arguments.","PeriodicalId":30534,"journal":{"name":"Laws","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Laws","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030041","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

According to Dworkin, “truth” is an interpretative concept. Why? Moral judgements are often the subject of disagreement because they are often the result of divergent conceptual understandings. If, on the other hand, we want to interpret concepts correctly, we have to deal with the analysis of the underlying values we attach to these concepts. Dworkin understands the true as a matter of interpretation, which—and this is often misunderstood—is capable of producing a correct conception of the truth. The truth is thereby directly related to justice. Dworkin even ties his theory of interpretation to an objective truth that can only produce conclusive reasons for a specific advocacy of a particular position in an argument after responsible and intensive debate—in the sense of his two-stage theory. In fact, it turns out that Dworkin’s search for and conception of an objective truth describes a (historical) process. We interpret what our ancestors have already interpreted and continue to understand (in a modified way). This reflexive responsibility is ours to bear; according to Dworkin, it is our responsibility to always stand up for truth through good arguments.
罗纳德·德沃金:通过责任寻求真理和正义
根据德沃金的说法,“真理”是一个解释性的概念。为什么?道德判断往往是分歧的主题,因为它们往往是不同概念理解的结果。另一方面,如果我们想正确地解释概念,我们就必须分析我们对这些概念的潜在价值。德沃金将真理理解为一种解释,这种解释——这经常被误解——能够产生对真理的正确概念。因此,真相与正义直接相关。德沃金甚至将他的解释理论与一个客观真理联系在一起,这个客观真理只能在经过负责任和深入的辩论后,在一场争论中为特定立场的具体主张提供确凿的理由——从他的两阶段理论的意义上讲。事实上,德沃金对客观真理的探索和概念描述了一个(历史)过程。我们解释我们的祖先已经解释并继续理解(以一种修改的方式)。这种反射性的责任是我们应该承担的;根据德沃金的说法,我们有责任通过良好的论据来捍卫真理。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
Laws
Laws LAW-
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
16.70%
发文量
77
审稿时长
11 weeks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信