{"title":"The Responsiveness of Medicaid Spending to the Federal Subsidy","authors":"M. Bundorf, D. Kessler","doi":"10.1086/721912","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Although economic theory suggests that the federal government can influence spending by states through subsidies to programs that states operate, no recent work has quantified the magnitude of this effect for Medicaid, the largest program of this type in the United States. We find that Medicaid spending per enrollee responds to the magnitude of the federal subsidy. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and its subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court gave states the option to expand eligibility for their Medicaid programs in exchange for increases in the generosity of the federal subsidy for the population made eligible by the expansion. States that exercised this option increased Medicaid spending per enrollee on enrollees who were eligible even before the ACA by approximately 15 percent. Depending on the specification, this translates into an elasticity of Medicaid spending per enrollee with respect to the after-subsidy price of Medicaid to a state of −0.494 to −0.579.","PeriodicalId":18983,"journal":{"name":"National Tax Journal","volume":"75 1","pages":"661 - 680"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"National Tax Journal","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721912","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Although economic theory suggests that the federal government can influence spending by states through subsidies to programs that states operate, no recent work has quantified the magnitude of this effect for Medicaid, the largest program of this type in the United States. We find that Medicaid spending per enrollee responds to the magnitude of the federal subsidy. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and its subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court gave states the option to expand eligibility for their Medicaid programs in exchange for increases in the generosity of the federal subsidy for the population made eligible by the expansion. States that exercised this option increased Medicaid spending per enrollee on enrollees who were eligible even before the ACA by approximately 15 percent. Depending on the specification, this translates into an elasticity of Medicaid spending per enrollee with respect to the after-subsidy price of Medicaid to a state of −0.494 to −0.579.
期刊介绍:
The goal of the National Tax Journal (NTJ) is to encourage and disseminate high quality original research on governmental tax and expenditure policies. Articles published in the regular March, June and September issues of the journal, as well as articles accepted for publication in special issues of the journal, are subject to professional peer review and include economic, theoretical, and empirical analyses of tax and expenditure issues with an emphasis on policy implications. The NTJ has been published quarterly since 1948 under the auspices of the National Tax Association (NTA). Most issues include an NTJ Forum, which consists of invited papers by leading scholars that examine in depth a single current tax or expenditure policy issue. The December issue is devoted to publishing papers presented at the NTA’s annual Spring Symposium; the articles in the December issue generally are not subject to peer review.