Aristotle and Boethius: Two Theses and Their Possibilities

Miguel López‐Astorga
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Abstract

There is a kind of logical theses that can be a cognitive problem. They are theses that are not tautologies and people tend to accept as absolutely correct. This is the case of theses such as those of Aristotle and Boethius. This paper tries to give an explanation of the reasons why this happens. The explanation is based on the theory of mental models. However, it also resorts to modal logic and the account of the ideas presented by Lenzen. Thus, relating the general framework of the theory of mental models to basic aspects of modal logic and this last account, a possible solution of the problem is proposed.
亚里士多德和波伊提乌:两个论点及其可能性
有一种逻辑命题可能是一个认知问题。它们不是同义词,人们倾向于认为它们是绝对正确的。亚里士多德和波依修斯的论文就是这样。本文试图解释为什么会发生这种情况。这种解释是基于心理模型的理论。然而,它也诉诸于模态逻辑和Lenzen提出的思想。因此,将心理模型理论的一般框架与模态逻辑的基本方面联系起来,并提出了问题的可能解决方案。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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28
审稿时长
12 weeks
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