The Unmeritorious ‘Legality’/‘Merits’ Distinction in Singapore Administrative Law

Q3 Social Sciences
B. Ong
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract The Singapore courts often state that judicial review of executive decision-making ought only to involve an inquiry into the ‘legality’ of a decision or the ‘decision-making process’, and not the ‘decision itself’ or its ‘merits’ – let us call this the ‘Distinction’. This article argues that the Distinction should be expunged from Singapore law. The Distinction has its roots in English case law which aimed to prevent the courts from arbitrarily substituting their decision for the executive's by reason of mere disagreement. But Singapore case law has gone further and treated the Distinction as a general principle applicable to all of administrative law. However, the Distinction is too vague for this purpose (as seen from Singapore cases which have interpreted the distinction inconsistently). It is conceptually problematic, incompatible with the practicalities of judicial review (particularly substantive review as recognized in Singapore law), and has occasionally been paid lip service but not followed in substance. The Distinction cannot form a coherent principle to guide the courts and ought to be replaced by a more nuanced application of constitutional principles relevant to determining the appropriate scope of review. Whatever these principles may be, and however they are to be balanced, the Distinction can be but an over-inclusive rough approximation of them which hampers the development of the law.
新加坡行政法中的“合法性”与“优点”之分
摘要新加坡法院经常指出,对行政决策的司法审查只应涉及对决定或“决策过程”的“合法性”的调查,而不应涉及“决定本身”或其“优点”——让我们称之为“区别”。本文认为,新加坡法律应删除这一区别。这种区别源于英国的判例法,该判例法旨在防止法院仅仅因为意见不一致而武断地用他们的决定代替行政部门的决定。但新加坡判例法更进一步,将区分作为适用于所有行政法的一般原则。然而,就这一目的而言,区分过于模糊(从新加坡的案例中可以看出,这些案例对区分的解释不一致)。它在概念上是有问题的,与司法审查(特别是新加坡法律承认的实质性审查)的实用性不兼容,偶尔会得到口头上的支持,但没有得到实质性的支持。区别不能形成一个连贯的原则来指导法院,应该用更细致地应用与确定适当审查范围相关的宪法原则来取代。无论这些原则是什么,无论它们如何平衡,区别都可能只是对它们的过于包容的粗略近似,这阻碍了法律的发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Asian Journal of Comparative Law
Asian Journal of Comparative Law Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
期刊介绍: The Asian Journal of Comparative Law (AsJCL) is the leading forum for research and discussion of the law and legal systems of Asia. It embraces work that is theoretical, empirical, socio-legal, doctrinal or comparative that relates to one or more Asian legal systems, as well as work that compares one or more Asian legal systems with non-Asian systems. The Journal seeks articles which display an intimate knowledge of Asian legal systems, and thus provide a window into the way they work in practice. The AsJCL is an initiative of the Asian Law Institute (ASLI), an association established by thirteen leading law schools in Asia and with a rapidly expanding membership base across Asia and in other regions around the world.
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