Combatting corruption and collusion in public procurement: Lessons from Operation Car Wash

IF 0.7 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Alison Jones, Caio Mário S. Pereira Neto
{"title":"Combatting corruption and collusion in public procurement: Lessons from Operation Car Wash","authors":"Alison Jones, Caio Mário S. Pereira Neto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3712858","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article examines the question of how a nation can combat corruption and collusion and prevent these practices from plaguing and undermining public procurement processes. This matter is especially important to Brazil where Operation Car Wash exposed widespread corruption and collusion affecting public procurement. Although focusing on Brazil, this article reflects on a broader academic and policy debate as to how a nation can escape from a ‘high-corruption’ equilibrium, especially one strengthened by its interaction with supplier collusion. In particular, whether endemic corruption can be combatted through an invigorated law enforcement push, combined with incremental reform, or whether some ‘big bang’ approach, with complete institutional overhaul, is required to establish a new equilibrium. The article notes that the Brazilian experience provides support for the hypothesis that, where corruption is endemic, better laws and law enforcement may be insufficient on their own to break a cycle and to remove the incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion that exist. However, it also recognizes that, for many jurisdictions, wholesale big bang reform is unlikely to be feasible. It thus proposes a multi-pronged, and self-reinforcing, set of reforms to trigger change, concentrated on weaknesses diagnosed in the system. In particular, it suggests that where corruption affects public procurement, beyond specific adjustments to procurement, competition and anti-corruption laws, procurers, anti-corruption and competition enforcement agencies need to work closely together to coordinate policies, achieve synergies and to combat incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion within procurement processes. Such reforms must be combined with measures to tackle broader factors contributing to systemic corruption. Although inspired by the Brazilian case study, the diagnosis and proposed reform strategy provides a workable model for use in other jurisdictions.","PeriodicalId":46289,"journal":{"name":"University of Toronto Law Journal","volume":"71 1","pages":"103 - 150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Toronto Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3712858","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract:This article examines the question of how a nation can combat corruption and collusion and prevent these practices from plaguing and undermining public procurement processes. This matter is especially important to Brazil where Operation Car Wash exposed widespread corruption and collusion affecting public procurement. Although focusing on Brazil, this article reflects on a broader academic and policy debate as to how a nation can escape from a ‘high-corruption’ equilibrium, especially one strengthened by its interaction with supplier collusion. In particular, whether endemic corruption can be combatted through an invigorated law enforcement push, combined with incremental reform, or whether some ‘big bang’ approach, with complete institutional overhaul, is required to establish a new equilibrium. The article notes that the Brazilian experience provides support for the hypothesis that, where corruption is endemic, better laws and law enforcement may be insufficient on their own to break a cycle and to remove the incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion that exist. However, it also recognizes that, for many jurisdictions, wholesale big bang reform is unlikely to be feasible. It thus proposes a multi-pronged, and self-reinforcing, set of reforms to trigger change, concentrated on weaknesses diagnosed in the system. In particular, it suggests that where corruption affects public procurement, beyond specific adjustments to procurement, competition and anti-corruption laws, procurers, anti-corruption and competition enforcement agencies need to work closely together to coordinate policies, achieve synergies and to combat incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion within procurement processes. Such reforms must be combined with measures to tackle broader factors contributing to systemic corruption. Although inspired by the Brazilian case study, the diagnosis and proposed reform strategy provides a workable model for use in other jurisdictions.
打击公共采购中的腐败和勾结:洗车行动的经验教训
摘要:本文探讨了一个国家如何打击腐败和勾结,防止这些做法困扰和破坏公共采购过程的问题。这件事对巴西尤为重要,因为“洗车行动”揭露了影响公共采购的广泛腐败和勾结。尽管这篇文章关注的是巴西,但它反映了一场更广泛的学术和政策辩论,即一个国家如何摆脱“高度腐败”的平衡,尤其是通过与供应商勾结的互动而加强的平衡。特别是,是否可以通过强有力的执法推动,结合渐进式改革来打击地方性腐败,或者是否需要一些“大爆炸”的方法,通过彻底的制度改革来建立新的平衡。文章指出,巴西的经验支持这样一种假设,即在腐败盛行的地方,更好的法律和执法本身可能不足以打破循环,消除腐败和勾结的动机和机会。然而,它也认识到,对许多司法管辖区来说,大规模的大爆炸改革不太可能可行。因此,它提出了一套多管齐下、自我强化的改革方案,以引发变革,集中解决系统中诊断出的弱点。报告特别指出,在腐败影响公共采购的情况下,除了对采购、竞争和反腐败法进行具体调整外,采购人员、反腐败和竞争执法机构还需要密切合作,协调政策,实现协同增效,并打击采购过程中腐败和勾结的动机和机会。这些改革必须与解决导致系统性腐败的更广泛因素的措施相结合。尽管受到巴西案例研究的启发,但诊断和拟议的改革战略为其他司法管辖区提供了一个可行的模式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
26
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信