{"title":"Combatting corruption and collusion in public procurement: Lessons from Operation Car Wash","authors":"Alison Jones, Caio Mário S. Pereira Neto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3712858","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article examines the question of how a nation can combat corruption and collusion and prevent these practices from plaguing and undermining public procurement processes. This matter is especially important to Brazil where Operation Car Wash exposed widespread corruption and collusion affecting public procurement. Although focusing on Brazil, this article reflects on a broader academic and policy debate as to how a nation can escape from a ‘high-corruption’ equilibrium, especially one strengthened by its interaction with supplier collusion. In particular, whether endemic corruption can be combatted through an invigorated law enforcement push, combined with incremental reform, or whether some ‘big bang’ approach, with complete institutional overhaul, is required to establish a new equilibrium. The article notes that the Brazilian experience provides support for the hypothesis that, where corruption is endemic, better laws and law enforcement may be insufficient on their own to break a cycle and to remove the incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion that exist. However, it also recognizes that, for many jurisdictions, wholesale big bang reform is unlikely to be feasible. It thus proposes a multi-pronged, and self-reinforcing, set of reforms to trigger change, concentrated on weaknesses diagnosed in the system. In particular, it suggests that where corruption affects public procurement, beyond specific adjustments to procurement, competition and anti-corruption laws, procurers, anti-corruption and competition enforcement agencies need to work closely together to coordinate policies, achieve synergies and to combat incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion within procurement processes. Such reforms must be combined with measures to tackle broader factors contributing to systemic corruption. Although inspired by the Brazilian case study, the diagnosis and proposed reform strategy provides a workable model for use in other jurisdictions.","PeriodicalId":46289,"journal":{"name":"University of Toronto Law Journal","volume":"71 1","pages":"103 - 150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Toronto Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3712858","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract:This article examines the question of how a nation can combat corruption and collusion and prevent these practices from plaguing and undermining public procurement processes. This matter is especially important to Brazil where Operation Car Wash exposed widespread corruption and collusion affecting public procurement. Although focusing on Brazil, this article reflects on a broader academic and policy debate as to how a nation can escape from a ‘high-corruption’ equilibrium, especially one strengthened by its interaction with supplier collusion. In particular, whether endemic corruption can be combatted through an invigorated law enforcement push, combined with incremental reform, or whether some ‘big bang’ approach, with complete institutional overhaul, is required to establish a new equilibrium. The article notes that the Brazilian experience provides support for the hypothesis that, where corruption is endemic, better laws and law enforcement may be insufficient on their own to break a cycle and to remove the incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion that exist. However, it also recognizes that, for many jurisdictions, wholesale big bang reform is unlikely to be feasible. It thus proposes a multi-pronged, and self-reinforcing, set of reforms to trigger change, concentrated on weaknesses diagnosed in the system. In particular, it suggests that where corruption affects public procurement, beyond specific adjustments to procurement, competition and anti-corruption laws, procurers, anti-corruption and competition enforcement agencies need to work closely together to coordinate policies, achieve synergies and to combat incentives and opportunities for corruption and collusion within procurement processes. Such reforms must be combined with measures to tackle broader factors contributing to systemic corruption. Although inspired by the Brazilian case study, the diagnosis and proposed reform strategy provides a workable model for use in other jurisdictions.