{"title":"The COVID-19 emergency in the age of executive aggrandizement: what role for legislative and judicial checks?","authors":"Jan Petrov","doi":"10.1080/20508840.2020.1788232","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Extraordinary limitation of certain fundamental rights seems necessary in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. Many countries have declared a state of emergency for that purpose. Yet, there is also a risk of misusing the emergency for power grabbing, especially in the current era of executive aggrandizement, democratic decay and abusive populist constitutionalism. In this setting the legislative and judicial checks on the executive create a dilemma. Their standard operation in the state of emergency could control the executive, but might also impair its capacity to fight the pandemic effectively. This article therefore focuses on the desired role of the legislature and the judiciary in COVID-19 emergencies. Although many constitutions address emergencies, they are often vague and leave considerable room for the involved actors themselves to adjust their behaviour. This article asks how parliaments and courts should use this de facto room. I argue that they should show some deference to the executive, its level depending on the stage and severity of the crisis, but should not clear the field for governments. They must modify their activities but not suspend them. My main argument is that the deliberative and scrutiny functions of the legislature and the dispute-resolution function of courts are crucial not only for preventing the abuse of emergency measures, but also for increasing the effectiveness of emergency measures by improving conditions necessary for compliance. The legislature and courts can contribute to the higher feasibility and legitimacy of the emergency measures and thereby increase voluntary compliance, which is crucial for tackling the spread of the new coronavirus. The article illustrates these issues by way of the case study of the Czech Republic – a country experiencing its first nationwide state of emergency amid tendencies towards democratic decay and managerial populism.","PeriodicalId":42455,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Practice of Legislation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20508840.2020.1788232","citationCount":"39","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theory and Practice of Legislation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2020.1788232","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 39
Abstract
ABSTRACT Extraordinary limitation of certain fundamental rights seems necessary in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. Many countries have declared a state of emergency for that purpose. Yet, there is also a risk of misusing the emergency for power grabbing, especially in the current era of executive aggrandizement, democratic decay and abusive populist constitutionalism. In this setting the legislative and judicial checks on the executive create a dilemma. Their standard operation in the state of emergency could control the executive, but might also impair its capacity to fight the pandemic effectively. This article therefore focuses on the desired role of the legislature and the judiciary in COVID-19 emergencies. Although many constitutions address emergencies, they are often vague and leave considerable room for the involved actors themselves to adjust their behaviour. This article asks how parliaments and courts should use this de facto room. I argue that they should show some deference to the executive, its level depending on the stage and severity of the crisis, but should not clear the field for governments. They must modify their activities but not suspend them. My main argument is that the deliberative and scrutiny functions of the legislature and the dispute-resolution function of courts are crucial not only for preventing the abuse of emergency measures, but also for increasing the effectiveness of emergency measures by improving conditions necessary for compliance. The legislature and courts can contribute to the higher feasibility and legitimacy of the emergency measures and thereby increase voluntary compliance, which is crucial for tackling the spread of the new coronavirus. The article illustrates these issues by way of the case study of the Czech Republic – a country experiencing its first nationwide state of emergency amid tendencies towards democratic decay and managerial populism.
期刊介绍:
The Theory and Practice of Legislation aims to offer an international and interdisciplinary forum for the examination of legislation. The focus of the journal, which succeeds the former title Legisprudence, remains with legislation in its broadest sense. Legislation is seen as both process and product, reflection of theoretical assumptions and a skill. The journal addresses formal legislation, and its alternatives (such as covenants, regulation by non-state actors etc.). The editors welcome articles on systematic (as opposed to historical) issues, including drafting techniques, the introduction of open standards, evidence-based drafting, pre- and post-legislative scrutiny for effectiveness and efficiency, the utility and necessity of codification, IT in legislation, the legitimacy of legislation in view of fundamental principles and rights, law and language, and the link between legislator and judge. Comparative and interdisciplinary approaches are encouraged. But dogmatic descriptions of positive law are outside the scope of the journal. The journal offers a combination of themed issues and general issues. All articles are submitted to double blind review.