Feuerbach and Kierkegaard on Sin as Infinite Qualitative Difference

Abstract

Abstract By contextualising the striking similarities in Feuerbach and Kierkegaard’s conceptions of sin as infinite qualitative difference, and the related question of the individual and the species as a shared response to the Hegelian Entzweiung, this article seeks to offer a new framework for understanding Feuerbach’s critique of Christian theology and of Kierkegaard’s famous articulation of the infinite qualitative difference as simultaneously ontological, hamartiological, and soteriological. It argues that Kierkegaard offers a modification of the Feuerbachian account to argue against Feuerbach’s conclusion that the Christian doctrine of sin negates qualitative differences between individual humans, and to conversely affirm that sin differentiates not just God and humans, but each single individual too. Kierkegaard might be said to at once uphold Feuerbach’s critique of Hegelian theology, while inverting Feuerbach’s anti-theological programme by harnessing the ambiguities that appear in Feuerbach’s account of sin. It is thereby shown how both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard make use of Hegelian logic, both through their formal application of the concepts of quality and quantity, as well as their creative appropriation of the notion of Entzweiung.