On foreign aid effectiveness: when conditionality met ownership

IF 3.3 3区经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Journal of Economic Policy Reform Pub Date : 2021-07-08 DOI:10.1080/17487870.2021.1941958

Francisco Candel-Sánchez

引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a game theoretic approach to deal with the problem of implementing the efficient allocation of aid and reform through policy conditionality. We show that optimality can only be attained by a conditional scheme that takes into account the characteristics of both donor and recipient. Moreover, the levels of aid and reform induced by such a mechanism are, under certain conditions, compatible with the goals of the recipient government. This result reconciles ownership with a specific form of conditionality.

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论对外援助的有效性:当条件性遇到所有权时

摘要在本文中，我们提出了一种博弈论方法来处理通过政策条件实现援助和改革的有效分配问题。我们证明了最优性只能通过一个同时考虑捐赠者和接受者特征的条件方案来实现。此外，在某些条件下，这种机制所引发的援助和改革水平与受援国政府的目标是一致的。这一结果调和了所有权与特定形式的条件。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Policy Reform Multiple-

CiteScore

6.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Policy Reform focuses on the analysis of economic policy reform. The journal draws upon what lessons can be learned from the successes and failures of countries undertaking reforms and how existing theories can be developed to shed light on positive as well as normative aspects of the reform process. The Journal of Economic Policy Reform encourages work from economists and political economy analysts on policies to promote growth and reduce poverty, intellectual property rights, aid versus trade, debt and debt relief, taxation and social security systems, surveys of key reform issues, as well as on corruption, democracy, emerging markets and the role of multilateral institutions.