{"title":"Religious institutionalism: A feminist response","authors":"K. Chan","doi":"10.3138/UTLJ-2020-0098","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:People who are committed to religious freedom are generally also committed to protecting the conditions for the cultivation of religious life. Because of the deep linkages between religious belief and practice and religious institutions, it can seem natural and straightforward to move from championing religious freedom to championing religious freedom for religious institutions themselves. Members of the Supreme Court of Canada indicated their readiness to make this move in a 2015 case involving a Catholic secondary school in Quebec. In this article, I challenge the idea that according religious institutions section 2(a) protection in their own right is either a natural or a straightforward consequence of a commitment to collective religious freedom. I describe the intellectual history and characteristics of religious institutionalism and summarize the claims of its principal Canadian proponent. I then outline several ways in which religious institutionalism clashes with our basic constitutional commitments. Finally, I develop several prongs of a feminist response to religious institutionalism. I highlight the normative character of questions about the constitutional status of religious institutions, the gendered nature of the relationship between religious institutions and individual rights-holders, and the organic and dynamic features of religious institutions. I argue that we must approach institutional religious freedom claims cautiously and resist any interpretation of section 2(a) that would entrench and shield from internal resistance a singular, institutional religious voice.","PeriodicalId":46289,"journal":{"name":"University of Toronto Law Journal","volume":"71 1","pages":"443 - 479"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Toronto Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3138/UTLJ-2020-0098","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract:People who are committed to religious freedom are generally also committed to protecting the conditions for the cultivation of religious life. Because of the deep linkages between religious belief and practice and religious institutions, it can seem natural and straightforward to move from championing religious freedom to championing religious freedom for religious institutions themselves. Members of the Supreme Court of Canada indicated their readiness to make this move in a 2015 case involving a Catholic secondary school in Quebec. In this article, I challenge the idea that according religious institutions section 2(a) protection in their own right is either a natural or a straightforward consequence of a commitment to collective religious freedom. I describe the intellectual history and characteristics of religious institutionalism and summarize the claims of its principal Canadian proponent. I then outline several ways in which religious institutionalism clashes with our basic constitutional commitments. Finally, I develop several prongs of a feminist response to religious institutionalism. I highlight the normative character of questions about the constitutional status of religious institutions, the gendered nature of the relationship between religious institutions and individual rights-holders, and the organic and dynamic features of religious institutions. I argue that we must approach institutional religious freedom claims cautiously and resist any interpretation of section 2(a) that would entrench and shield from internal resistance a singular, institutional religious voice.