{"title":"ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk-taking","authors":"Faek Menla Ali, Yuanyuan Wu, Xiaoxiang Zhang","doi":"10.1111/eufm.12447","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure on corporate risk-taking and how this impact is further affected by chief executive officer (CEO) power and incentives within US companies. We find that ESG disclosure decreases corporate risk-taking based on both accounting-based and market-based returns. Further, we find that ESG disclosure is more effective in mitigating market-based risk-taking than accounting-based risk-taking in a firm with a powerful CEO. In contrast, CEO's ESG-incentivized engagement bonuses weaken ESG disclosure impacts in reducing both types of risk-taking. Our analysis helps understanding of different trade-offs of ESG disclosure in aligning all stakeholders' benefits under different managerial-related factors.</p>","PeriodicalId":47815,"journal":{"name":"European Financial Management","volume":"30 2","pages":"961-1011"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/eufm.12447","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Financial Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eufm.12447","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure on corporate risk-taking and how this impact is further affected by chief executive officer (CEO) power and incentives within US companies. We find that ESG disclosure decreases corporate risk-taking based on both accounting-based and market-based returns. Further, we find that ESG disclosure is more effective in mitigating market-based risk-taking than accounting-based risk-taking in a firm with a powerful CEO. In contrast, CEO's ESG-incentivized engagement bonuses weaken ESG disclosure impacts in reducing both types of risk-taking. Our analysis helps understanding of different trade-offs of ESG disclosure in aligning all stakeholders' benefits under different managerial-related factors.
期刊介绍：
European Financial Management publishes the best research from around the world, providing a forum for both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of modern corporation and financial institutions. The journal publishes signficant new finance research on timely issues and highlights key trends in Europe in a clear and accessible way, with articles covering international research and practice that have direct or indirect bearing on Europe.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
