University-Affiliated Research Centers: evasive entrepreneurship within the DOD

IF 1.5 Q2 ECONOMICS
Chandler S. Reilly
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

PurposeThe Department of Defense (DOD) has long partnered with universities and other nonprofit organizations to perform early-stage, military-related research using research centers established under long-term contracts known as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). Over the last 25 years, there has been a shift in the type of arrangement used to University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) that this paper argues is the result of bureaucrats acting as evasive entrepreneurs in response to changing regulations.Design/methodology/approachExtending the theory of evasive entrepreneurship to bureaucrats, the author shows how regulations increase the cost of bureaucratic action and incentivize the creation of substitute actions to avoid those regulatory costs and capture benefits. Qualitative evidence from DOD documents is used to support the contention that UARCs serve the same function as FFRDCs. Quantitative evidence on the number of FFRDCs and UARCs and their funding illustrates how bureaucrats respond to political restrictions.FindingsBureaucrats have little to no recourse to respond to budgetary cuts or spending ceilings. In the case of FFRDCs, spending ceilings were introduced starting in the 1960s and led to a decline in the number of DOD FFRDCs. Bureaucrats can however strategically evade new regulations by reorganizing transactions justified by existing federal law that contradicts new regulations. Once FFRDCs were federally regulated in 1990 there were strong incentives to create substitute arrangements leading to the creation of UARCs in 1996 that have ultimately replaced FFRDCs as the research center of choice for the DOD.Originality/valueThe article makes three contributions. First, it applies the concept of evasive entrepreneurship to a political context and then use that framework to understand the creation and establishment of the DOD's UARCS. Second, the organizational features and purpose of UARCs are analyzed. Third, the evidence provided shows how regulations resulted in a shift in the DOD's R&D strategy toward working with universities.
大学附属研究中心:国防部规避创业
目的国防部(DOD)长期以来一直与大学和其他非营利组织合作,利用根据长期合同成立的研究中心,即联邦资助的研究与发展中心(FFRDCs),进行早期军事相关研究。在过去的25年里,大学附属研究中心(UARC)使用的安排类型发生了变化,本文认为这是官僚们在应对不断变化的法规时充当回避企业家的结果。设计/方法论/方法将规避创业理论扩展到官僚,作者展示了监管如何增加官僚行动的成本,并激励创造替代行动,以避免这些监管成本并获取利益。国防部文件中的定性证据用于支持UARC与FFRDC具有相同功能的论点。关于FFRDC和UARC数量及其资金的定量证据说明了官僚们如何应对政治限制。发现官僚们几乎没有办法对预算削减或支出上限做出回应。就FFRDC而言,从20世纪60年代开始引入支出上限,导致国防部FFRDC的数量下降。然而,官僚们可以战略性地通过重组与新法规相矛盾的现有联邦法律所证明的交易来规避新法规。1990年,一旦FFRDC受到联邦监管,就有强烈的动机创建替代安排,导致1996年创建UARC,最终取代FFRDC成为国防部的研究中心。首先,它将回避创业的概念应用于政治背景,然后利用该框架来理解国防部UARCS的创建和建立。其次,分析了UARC的组织特点和宗旨。第三,提供的证据表明,法规如何导致国防部的研发战略转向与大学合作。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.70
自引率
15.80%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Institutions – especially public policies – are a significant determinant of economic outcomes; entrepreneurship and enterprise development are often the channel by which public policies affect economic outcomes, and by which outcomes feed back to the policy process. The Journal of Entrepreneurship & Public Policy (JEPP) was created to encourage and disseminate quality research about these vital relationships. The ultimate aim is to improve the quality of the political discourse about entrepreneurship and development policies. JEPP publishes two issues per year and welcomes: Empirically oriented academic papers and accepts a wide variety of empirical evidence. Generally, the journal considers any analysis based on real-world circumstances and conditions that can change behaviour, legislation, or outcomes, Conceptual or theoretical papers that indicate a direction for future research, or otherwise advance the field of study, A limited number of carefully and accurately executed replication studies, Book reviews. In general, JEPP seeks high-quality articles that say something interesting about the relationships among public policy and entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship and economic development, or all three areas. Scope/Coverage: Entrepreneurship, Public policy, Public policies and behaviour of economic agents, Interjurisdictional differentials and their effects, Law and entrepreneurship, New firms; startups, Microeconomic analyses of economic development, Development planning and policy, Innovation and invention: processes and incentives, Regional economic activity: growth, development, and changes, Regional development policy.
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