Understanding right-wing populism and what to do about it

Q4 Social Sciences
Daphne Halikiopoulou, Tim Vlandas
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However, while cultural concerns are often a stronger predictor of RWPP voting behaviour, this does not automatically mean that they matter more for RWPP success because people with economic concerns are often a numerically larger group. Many RWPP voters do not have exclusively cultural concerns over immigration as figure 1 shows.</p><p>This suggests we must distinguish between core and peripheral voter groups. Voters primarily concerned with the cultural impact of immigration are core RWPP voters. Although they might be highly likely to vote for RWPPs, they also tend to be a numerically small group. By contrast, voters that are primarily concerned with the economic impact of immigration are peripheral voters. They are also highly likely to vote for RWPPs, but in addition they are a numerically larger group. Since the interests and preferences of these two groups can differ, successful RWPPs tend to be those that are able to attract both groups.</p><p>What strategies do RWPPs adopt to capitalise on their core and peripheral electorates? While we examine the success of parties that tend to be defined as ‘right-wing populist’, we are also sceptical about the analytical utility of the term ‘populism’ to explain the rise of this phenomenon. Instead, we emphasise the importance of nationalism as a mobilisation tool that has facilitated RWPP success.</p><p>What type of policies can mitigate the economic risks driving different social groups to support RWPPs? European democracies have operated in a context of falling economic growth rates over the past decades, with recurrent economic crises in the 1970s, early 1990s, and from 2008 onwards. Many advanced economies have, in time, recovered, but growth has often not returned to the level of previous decades. Many governments have liberalised and ‘activated’9their labour markets often at the expense of a growing group of so-called labour market outsiders in precarious contracts.</p><p>In addition, accumulating debt is leading to a climate of permanent austerity while constraining the necessary physical and social investments that could underpin future growth. While economic developments obviously affect the life chances, insecurities and risks that individuals face, the degree of redistribution and the social insurance that developed welfare states provide shape the prevalence and political consequences of these developments.</p><p>Welfare state policies moderate a range of economic risks that individuals face. 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This finding is consistent with recent literature which suggests that the centre-left and RWPP electorates are considerably different,12 and that centre-left repositioning towards RWPP restrictive immigration policies may attract a small number of RWPP voters but alienate a much larger proportion of their own voters.13</p><p>First, RWPP core voters (those voters who oppose immigration on principle and have strong and exclusive cultural concerns over immigration) are a minority in most European countries. These voters are principled RWPP voters and are unlikely to switch to the centre-left even if it adopts ‘copycat’ strategies. They identify more staunchly with a right-wing platform and are more likely to switch from ‘far’ to centre-right. 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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Since the early 2010s, right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) have been on the rise across Europe. In much of Western Europe, RWPPs such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the French Rassemblement National (RN), and the Italian Lega have gradually permeated mainstream ground, increasing their support beyond their secure voter base and becoming progressively embedded in the system either as coalition partners or as credible opposition parties. In Southern Europe, RWPPs are increasingly successful in countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus that had formerly resisted the RWPP tide. In Central and Eastern Europe, previously mainstream parties including Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland have radicalised in government, increasingly adopting populist, illiberal, and authoritarian policy positions. Finally, in the Nordic countries, parties such as the Danish People's Party (DF), the Finns Party (PS), and the Sweden Democrats (SD) have also increased their electoral support, exerting substantial policy influence. These developments have in most cases taken place at the expense of the mainstream: while the average electoral score of RWPPs has been steadily increasing over time, support for both the mainstream left and right has declined.

This right-wing populist momentum sweeping Europe has three features. First, the successful electoral performance of parties pledging to restore national sovereignty and implement policies that consistently prioritise natives over immigrants. Many RWPPs have improved their electoral performance over time, although there remain important cross-national variations.

Second, the increasing entrenchment of these parties in their respective political systems through access to office. A substantial number of RWPPs have either recently governed or served as formal cooperation partners in right-wing minority governments. Examples abound: the Italian Lega, the Austrian FPÖ, the Polish PiS, the Hungarian Fidesz and the Danish DF. The so-called cordon sanitaire – the policy of marginalising extreme parties – has been breaking down even in countries where it had traditionally been effective.

What explains this phenomenon? Researchers and pundits alike tend to emphasise the political climate of RWPP normalisation and systemic entrenchment, where issues ‘owned’ by these parties are salient: immigration, nationalism, and cultural grievances. The importance of cultural values in shaping voting behaviour has led to an emerging, but only partly accurate, consensus that the increasing success of RWPPs may be best understood as a cultural backlash.1 Such theories posit that in a post-material world, societies are divided not by ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, but by those who support and those who reject multi-culturalism, cosmopolitanism, and globalisation. This ‘cultural backlash’ against multiple dimensions of globalisation defined by immigration scepticism translates into voting through support for RWPPs that own the immigration issue.

How do cultural and economic grievances affect individuals’ probability of voting for an RWPP? How are these grievances distributed among the RWPP electorate? We argue that immigration is neither necessarily nor exclusively a cultural issue.

Both cultural and economic concerns over immigration increase the likelihood of voting for an RWPP. However, while cultural concerns are often a stronger predictor of RWPP voting behaviour, this does not automatically mean that they matter more for RWPP success because people with economic concerns are often a numerically larger group. Many RWPP voters do not have exclusively cultural concerns over immigration as figure 1 shows.

This suggests we must distinguish between core and peripheral voter groups. Voters primarily concerned with the cultural impact of immigration are core RWPP voters. Although they might be highly likely to vote for RWPPs, they also tend to be a numerically small group. By contrast, voters that are primarily concerned with the economic impact of immigration are peripheral voters. They are also highly likely to vote for RWPPs, but in addition they are a numerically larger group. Since the interests and preferences of these two groups can differ, successful RWPPs tend to be those that are able to attract both groups.

What strategies do RWPPs adopt to capitalise on their core and peripheral electorates? While we examine the success of parties that tend to be defined as ‘right-wing populist’, we are also sceptical about the analytical utility of the term ‘populism’ to explain the rise of this phenomenon. Instead, we emphasise the importance of nationalism as a mobilisation tool that has facilitated RWPP success.

What type of policies can mitigate the economic risks driving different social groups to support RWPPs? European democracies have operated in a context of falling economic growth rates over the past decades, with recurrent economic crises in the 1970s, early 1990s, and from 2008 onwards. Many advanced economies have, in time, recovered, but growth has often not returned to the level of previous decades. Many governments have liberalised and ‘activated’9their labour markets often at the expense of a growing group of so-called labour market outsiders in precarious contracts.

In addition, accumulating debt is leading to a climate of permanent austerity while constraining the necessary physical and social investments that could underpin future growth. While economic developments obviously affect the life chances, insecurities and risks that individuals face, the degree of redistribution and the social insurance that developed welfare states provide shape the prevalence and political consequences of these developments.

Welfare state policies moderate a range of economic risks that individuals face. Our analysis illustrates that this reduces the likelihood of supporting RWPPs among insecure individuals – for example, the unemployed, pensioners, low-income workers, and employees on temporary contracts.

Our analysis identifies regional patterns and different voter bases and grievances driving RWPP success across Europe. This suggests that there is no one single RWPP success formula. Progressive strategies addressing those necessarily face different obstacles depending on the context. For instance, the Western European centre-left has better chances of focussing on welfare expansion as an issue they ‘own’ than many counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe who have lost the ownership of those issues to RWPPs that promote distorted nationalist and chauvinist versions of similar ideas.

Overall, however, our analysis suggests that, in most cases, co-opting right-wing populist policy agendas is not a winning strategy for the centre-left. This finding is consistent with recent literature which suggests that the centre-left and RWPP electorates are considerably different,12 and that centre-left repositioning towards RWPP restrictive immigration policies may attract a small number of RWPP voters but alienate a much larger proportion of their own voters.13

First, RWPP core voters (those voters who oppose immigration on principle and have strong and exclusive cultural concerns over immigration) are a minority in most European countries. These voters are principled RWPP voters and are unlikely to switch to the centre-left even if it adopts ‘copycat’ strategies. They identify more staunchly with a right-wing platform and are more likely to switch from ‘far’ to centre-right. They are the least likely centre-left constituency and therefore cannot constitute a centre-left target voter group.

Second, a comparison between the RWPP and centre-left voter profiles reveals considerable differences, especially in terms of the attitudinal profiles of centre-left voters. In terms of subjective attitudinal factors, cultural concerns over immigration make it less likely to vote centre-left parties in both Eastern and Western Europe, but economic concerns only play a role in the West. Trust in the EU similarly increases support for the left in both regions, while authoritarian attitudes play no role in either region, and religious practices are associated with lower support for the centre-left. In other words, existing centre-left voters are highly unlikely to be attracted to RWPP culturalist arguments and may abandon centre-left parties if they adopt such positions.

Third, even among the RWPP electorate, individuals with exclusively cultural concerns over immigration (core voters) are often a minority. The RWPP electorate is composed of a significant percentage of people with either no immigration concerns or combined economic and cultural concerns. This suggests a large proportion of voters of these parties are protest or peripheral voters – voters whose opposition to immigration is contingent. Because these voters have salient inequality concerns – broadly defined to include declining social status or social mobility – and have no principled opposition to immigration, they can ‘switch’ to parties that emphasise issues related to equality and offer effective policy solutions to them.

Fourth, in most European countries the percentage of voters with immigration concerns among the centre-left electorate is rather low. The few that that do have immigration concerns are driven primarily by economic considerations. As such, their underlying frustrations could be understood as driven by inequality and material considerations and would likely switch if their economic concerns are met.

Centre-left parties should not be fooled into thinking they can simply copy the RWPP success playbook by going fully populist, embracing restrictive immigration policies, and competing on questions of national identity. Instead, they should appeal to the economic insecurities that many peripheral RWPP voters are concerned about, focussing on issues the centre-left ‘owns’ such as equality. After all, centre-left voters tend to be pro-immigration and a nationalist turn will likely alienate them. Successful centre-left strategies must attempt to galvanize the centre-left's core voter base by addressing the (economic) grievances that affect much larger parts of the whole electorate.

Abstract Image

了解右翼民粹主义以及如何应对
自2010年代初以来,右翼民粹主义政党(RWPPs)在欧洲各地兴起。在西欧的大部分地区,奥地利自由党(FPÖ)、法国国民大会党(RN)和意大利联盟党(Lega)等自由工党已经逐渐渗透到主流领域,在其稳固的选民基础之外获得了越来越多的支持,并逐渐作为联盟伙伴或可信的反对党嵌入到体系中。在南欧,再生水源计划在西班牙、葡萄牙和塞浦路斯等以前抵制再生水源计划浪潮的国家越来越成功。在中欧和东欧,以前的主流政党,包括匈牙利的青民盟(Fidesz)和波兰的法律与正义党(PiS),在政府中变得激进,越来越多地采取民粹主义、非自由主义和威权主义的政策立场。最后,在北欧国家,丹麦人民党(DF)、芬兰人党(PS)和瑞典民主党(SD)等政党也增加了他们的选举支持,发挥了实质性的政策影响力。在大多数情况下,这些发展是以牺牲主流为代价的:尽管随着时间的推移,rwpp的平均选举得分一直在稳步上升,但主流左翼和右翼的支持率都在下降。这股席卷欧洲的右翼民粹主义势头有三个特点。首先,承诺恢复国家主权和实施一贯优先考虑本国人而非移民的政策的政党在选举中的成功表现。随着时间的推移,许多地方自治团体的选举表现有所改善,尽管仍然存在重要的跨国差异。第二,这些政党通过进入各自的政治体系,在各自的政治体系中日益巩固地位。相当数量的工人党最近在右翼少数党政府中执政或担任正式合作伙伴。这样的例子比比皆是:意大利的Lega,奥地利的FPÖ,波兰的PiS,匈牙利的青民盟和丹麦的DF。所谓的“卫生警戒线”——将极端政党边缘化的政策——即使在传统上行之有效的国家也在瓦解。如何解释这种现象?研究人员和权威人士都倾向于强调RWPP正常化和系统壕沟的政治气候,其中这些政党“拥有”的问题是突出的:移民,民族主义和文化不满。文化价值在塑造投票行为方面的重要性导致了一种新兴的、但只是部分准确的共识,即rwpp的日益成功可能最好被理解为一种文化反弹这些理论认为,在后物质世界中,社会不是由“富人”和“穷人”划分的,而是由支持和反对多元文化主义、世界主义和全球化的人划分的。这种对移民怀疑主义所定义的全球化多维度的“文化反弹”,转化为投票支持拥有移民问题的乡镇企业。文化和经济上的不满如何影响个人投票给RWPP的可能性?这些不满在RWPP选民中是如何分配的?我们认为,移民既不一定也不完全是一个文化问题。对移民的文化和经济担忧增加了支持RWPP的可能性。然而,虽然文化问题往往是RWPP投票行为的一个更强的预测因素,但这并不意味着它们对RWPP的成功更重要,因为关注经济问题的人往往是一个数量更多的群体。正如图1所示,许多RWPP的选民并不仅仅关注移民的文化问题。这表明我们必须区分核心选民群体和外围选民群体。主要关注移民文化影响的选民是RWPP的核心选民。尽管他们很有可能投票给rwpp,但他们也往往是一个人数不多的群体。相比之下,主要关注移民对经济影响的选民是边缘选民。他们也极有可能投票给rwpp,但除此之外,他们是一个数量更大的群体。由于这两个群体的兴趣和偏好可能不同,成功的rwpp往往能够吸引这两个群体。rwpp采用什么策略来利用其核心和外围选民?当我们研究那些倾向于被定义为“右翼民粹主义”的政党的成功时,我们也怀疑“民粹主义”一词在解释这一现象兴起时的分析效用。相反,我们强调民族主义作为一种动员工具的重要性,它促进了RWPP的成功。什么类型的政策可以减轻经济风险,促使不同的社会群体支持rwpp ?过去几十年来,欧洲民主国家一直在经济增长率下降的背景下运行,上世纪70年代、90年代初以及2008年以来,经济危机反复出现。 许多发达经济体已经及时复苏,但增长往往没有回到过去几十年的水平。许多政府已经开放和“激活”了他们的劳动力市场,但代价是越来越多的所谓的劳动力市场局外人签订了不稳定的合同。此外,不断累积的债务正在导致一种永久性紧缩的气氛,同时限制了可能支撑未来增长的必要的物质和社会投资。虽然经济发展明显影响个人面临的生活机会、不安全感和风险,但发达福利国家提供的再分配程度和社会保险决定了这些发展的普遍性和政治后果。福利国家政策缓和了个人面临的一系列经济风险。我们的分析表明,这降低了不安全个体(例如失业者、养老金领取者、低收入工人和临时合同雇员)支持rwpp的可能性。我们的分析确定了推动RWPP在整个欧洲取得成功的地区模式、不同的选民基础和不满情绪。这表明没有一个单一的RWPP成功公式。根据具体情况,解决这些问题的渐进战略必然面临不同的障碍。例如,西欧中左派有更好的机会将福利扩张作为他们“拥有”的问题来关注,而中欧和东欧的许多同行则失去了这些问题的所有权,而后者则鼓吹扭曲的民族主义和沙文主义版本的类似想法。然而,总的来说,我们的分析表明,在大多数情况下,采纳右翼民粹主义政策议程并不是中左翼的制胜策略。这一发现与最近的文献一致,这些文献表明中左翼和RWPP的选民有很大的不同,并且中左翼对RWPP限制性移民政策的重新定位可能会吸引一小部分RWPP选民,但会疏远更大比例的他们自己的选民。首先,在大多数欧洲国家,RWPP核心选民(那些原则上反对移民,并对移民有着强烈而独特的文化关注的选民)是少数。这些选民是有原则的RWPP选民,即使采取“模仿”策略,他们也不太可能转向中左翼。他们更坚定地认同右翼纲领,更有可能从“极右”转向中右。他们是最不可能中左的选民,因此不能构成中左的目标选民群体。其次,比较RWPP和中左翼选民的特征,可以发现相当大的差异,尤其是中左翼选民的态度特征。就主观态度因素而言,对移民的文化担忧使得东欧和西欧的中左翼政党不太可能获得选票,但经济担忧仅在西方发挥作用。在这两个地区,对欧盟的信任同样会增加对左翼的支持,而专制态度在这两个地区都不起作用,宗教习俗与中左翼的支持率较低有关。换句话说,现有的中左翼选民极不可能被RWPP的文化主义观点所吸引,如果他们采取这种立场,他们可能会放弃中左翼政党。第三,即使在RWPP选民中,只关注移民文化问题的个人(核心选民)也往往是少数。RWPP的选民中有相当大比例的人不关心移民问题,也不关心经济和文化问题。这表明,这些政党的很大一部分选民是抗议选民或边缘选民——这些选民对移民的反对是偶然的。因为这些选民有明显的不平等问题——广义上包括社会地位下降或社会流动性下降——并且对移民没有原则上的反对,他们可以“转向”那些强调与平等有关的问题并为他们提供有效政策解决方案的政党。第四,在大多数欧洲国家,中左翼选民中有移民问题的选民比例相当低。少数几个确实有移民问题的国家主要是出于经济考虑。因此,他们潜在的挫折感可以理解为不平等和物质考虑的驱动,如果他们的经济问题得到满足,他们可能会转变。中左翼政党不应该被愚弄,认为他们可以简单地复制RWPP的成功剧本,完全走民粹主义路线,接受限制性移民政策,并在国家认同问题上展开竞争。相反,他们应该吸引许多外围RWPP选民所担心的经济不安全感,把重点放在中左翼“拥有”的问题上,比如平等。 毕竟,中左翼选民倾向于支持移民,而民族主义倾向可能会疏远他们。成功的中左翼战略必须试图通过解决影响整个选民中更大一部分的(经济)不满,来激发中左翼的核心选民基础。
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来源期刊
IPPR Progressive Review
IPPR Progressive Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
43
期刊介绍: The permafrost of no alternatives has cracked; the horizon of political possibilities is expanding. IPPR Progressive Review is a pluralistic space to debate where next for progressives, examine the opportunities and challenges confronting us and ask the big questions facing our politics: transforming a failed economic model, renewing a frayed social contract, building a new relationship with Europe. Publishing the best writing in economics, politics and culture, IPPR Progressive Review explores how we can best build a more equal, humane and prosperous society.
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