The inexorability of immortality: no need for God?

A. Smajdor
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Abstract

In this paper, I aim to show that a certain form of immortality, without the need for any intervention from a supernatural being, is almost inevitable for human beings. I take a physicalist starting point: I am a certain configuration of physical particles. Thus, if these particles were reassembled in the same configuration, I would necessarily come back into existence. I address a number of objections raised against this prospect by Eric T. Olson, who argues that the reassembly of such particles following their dispersal after death would be simply impossible, and that if it did occur, it would necessarily be a mere replica rather than the real ‘me’. I suggest that the random redistribution of particles can be thought of as the throw of cosmic ‘dice’. With any specific throw, the likelihood that it yields the particular configuration that constitutes ‘me’ is vanishingly small. But over infinite spans of time, this likelihood increases until it becomes a near certainty. I show that even if this reconfiguration lacks the same causal features as those that gave rise to the original me, this cannot imply that the reassembled me is a mere replica. I acknowledge that my conjectured form of immortality may be unappealing to theists and non-theists alike. I also note that it rests on a linear conception of time, which may not harmonise with current thinking in physics. However, these issues notwithstanding, my conjectured version of immortality is at least as inexorable as many other things we take for granted, which also rest on potentially flawed beliefs about the nature of time and space.
不朽的永恒:不需要上帝?
在这篇论文中,我的目的是表明,在不需要任何超自然生物干预的情况下,某种形式的永生对人类来说几乎是不可避免的。我从物理主义的角度出发:我是一个物理粒子的特定构型。因此,如果这些粒子以相同的配置重新组装,我必然会重新存在。我回应了埃里克·T·奥尔森对这一前景提出的一些反对意见,他认为,这种粒子在死后扩散后重新组装是完全不可能的,如果真的发生了,那必然只是一个复制品,而不是真正的“我”。我认为粒子的随机重新分布可以被认为是宇宙“骰子”的投掷。对于任何特定的投掷,它产生构成“我”的特定配置的可能性都微乎其微。但在无限的时间跨度内,这种可能性会增加,直到它几乎成为确定性。我表明,即使这种重新配置缺乏与产生最初的我相同的因果特征,这也不能意味着重新组装的我只是一个复制品。我承认,我推测的永生形式可能对有神论者和非有神论者都没有吸引力。我还注意到,它建立在时间的线性概念上,这可能与当前物理学的思维不协调。然而,尽管存在这些问题,我推测的永生至少和我们认为理所当然的许多其他事情一样不可阻挡,这些事情也建立在对时间和空间本质的潜在缺陷信念之上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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23
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52 weeks
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