{"title":"Carnapian Lessons for Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic","authors":"J. B. Becker Arenhart, Ivan Ferreira da Cunha","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2162327","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims at disentangling two distinct problems in present philosophy of logic: the a priori/a posteriori divide and the theory choice problem. A confusion of these problems is present in the heart of current anti-exceptionalism about logic, as the use of a posteriori methods is identified with theory choice. We illustrate how the division may be preserved in a version of anti-exceptionalism by discussing Carnap’s approach, which had both an a priori epistemology and a pragmatic account of logical theory choice. This contributes to illuminate the claim that the current understanding is mistaken in considering Carnap as an exceptionalist, and it also helps us to address one of the difficulties of current anti-exceptionalism, to know, that, by equating a posteriori with theory choice, it requires appeal to framework-independent facts. We suggest that the pragmatic account of both Quine and Carnap to theory choice was advanced precisely to avoid that kind of difficulty.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":"44 1","pages":"54 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History and Philosophy of Logic","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2162327","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper aims at disentangling two distinct problems in present philosophy of logic: the a priori/a posteriori divide and the theory choice problem. A confusion of these problems is present in the heart of current anti-exceptionalism about logic, as the use of a posteriori methods is identified with theory choice. We illustrate how the division may be preserved in a version of anti-exceptionalism by discussing Carnap’s approach, which had both an a priori epistemology and a pragmatic account of logical theory choice. This contributes to illuminate the claim that the current understanding is mistaken in considering Carnap as an exceptionalist, and it also helps us to address one of the difficulties of current anti-exceptionalism, to know, that, by equating a posteriori with theory choice, it requires appeal to framework-independent facts. We suggest that the pragmatic account of both Quine and Carnap to theory choice was advanced precisely to avoid that kind of difficulty.
期刊介绍:
History and Philosophy of Logic contains articles, notes and book reviews dealing with the history and philosophy of logic. ’Logic’ is understood to be any volume of knowledge which was regarded as logic at the time in question. ’History’ refers back to ancient times and also to work in this century; however, the Editor will not accept articles, including review articles, on very recent work on a topic. ’Philosophy’ refers to broad and general questions: specialist articles which are now classed as ’philosophical logic’ will not be published.
The Editor will consider articles on the relationship between logic and other branches of knowledge, but the component of logic must be substantial. Topics with no temporal specification are to be interpreted both historically and philosophically. Each topic includes its own metalogic where appropriate.