Words of Wonder: Initial Θαυμάζειν in Isocrates, Xenophon, and Related Texts

Abstract

In this paper I wish to draw attention to a widespread rhetorical and literary structure that I think has only been partially accounted for and one in which both Isocrates and Xenophon can be seen to participate. Indeed, their texts in particular constitute some of the best evidence we possess for what I take to be the chief purpose behind this rhetorical mannerism: the creation of the illusion of a spontaneous moment in which the merit of the truth claim of the author is self-evident, one that thus permits the author to proceed to other claims that are subordinate to this major one, without having to question again the basic merits of that claim. The trope to which I refer is the deployment at or near the start of an oration or other literary work of the term θαυμάζειν, meaning “to wonder at” or, less frequently in this context, “to admire”. Sometimes the “wondering” belongs to the rhetor/author himself, and at other times, it is attributed to another, either an addressee or the imagined audience of the work. The effect of this trope is to draw attention to a hidden truth, a fact of the world that has gone unrecognized or misunderstood, but now, thanks to the author/rhetor’s intervention, is now to be seen in a new light; once seen in this way, the truth of the fact as the author/rhetor sees it becomes self-evident. Related to this rhetorical use of θαυμάζειν is the aim of Socratic dialectic, whereby the interlocutor with Socrates is made to recognize that which is self-evident and true; indeed, Hans Joachim Mette has spoken of the central role that the θαυμάζειν-concept plays in connection with Plato’s “maieutic philosophy”.1 I have tried to resist referring to this trope as the posing of a “rhetorical question” as opposed to a “genuine”, information-seeking question, and prefer instead to follow Hayden Pelliccia’s formulation: “problem-posing”.