Familiarity Does Not Breed Contempt: Curbing Subsidiary Corruption Through a Legitimacy-Enhanced Ownership Structure

Q3 Business, Management and Accounting
J. Godinez, Rodrigo Bandeira de Mello, Luis Javier Sanchez-Barrios, M. Khalik
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract We analyze how the choice of firm ownership structure mitigates the effect of high dependence on a corrupt host government when investing abroad. We draw on a unique dataset of subsidiary-level engagement in corruption of 175 foreign subsidiaries entering three Central American countries. We found that there are two mechanisms to mitigate corrupt behavior when a subsidiary is dependent on a corrupt host government: internal legitimacy that accrues to wholly-owned subsidiaries, and external legitimacy built through a strong regional presence. The effect of dependency on a corrupt host government can be mitigated by enacting internal and external legitimacies.
熟悉不会滋生蔑视:通过合法性增强的所有权结构遏制子公司腐败
摘要我们分析了在海外投资时,企业所有权结构的选择如何减轻对腐败东道国政府高度依赖的影响。我们利用了一个独特的数据集,记录了进入中美洲三个国家的175家外国子公司在子公司层面参与腐败的情况。我们发现,当子公司依赖腐败的东道国政府时,有两种机制可以减轻腐败行为:全资子公司的内部合法性和通过强大的地区存在建立的外部合法性。依赖腐败的东道国政府的影响可以通过制定内部和外部合法性来减轻。
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来源期刊
Latin American Business Review
Latin American Business Review Business, Management and Accounting-Business and International Management
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
6
期刊介绍: Latin American Business Review is a quarterly, refereed journal which facilitates the exchange of information and new ideas between academics, business practitioners, public policymakers, and those in the international development community. Special features of the journal will keep you current on various teaching, research, and information sources. These activities all focus on the business and economic environment of the diverse and dynamic countries of the Americas.
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