Millar v Taylor as a precedent for statutory interpretation

Abstract

Millar v Taylor is an iconic case for statutory interpretation. It has long been regarded as the case in which the rule prohibiting reliance on legislative history was first put forward by Mr. Justice Willes in 1769. However, a close reading of the judgment reveals an uncomfortable fit between the rule that the case purports to stand for and the judicial reasoning within it. Meanwhile, the case was cited frequently throughout the 19th century, but never in support of the exclusionary rule. During that time period, the judiciary was aware of the fact that Mr. Justice Willes’ famous statement was contradicted by reasoning in the case. It was in the 20th century that scholars began citing Millar v Taylor in support of the exclusionary rule—a time when the quantity of published cases and secondary literature had increased significantly, and cases like Millar v Taylor were being cited without necessarily being read. This stands as a cautionary tale: one ought to quote with care, particularly when citing older cases.