The Background to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942: The Problem of Compromise Solutions for Lithuania (The Baltic States)

IF 0.1 Q4 HISTORY
Česlovas Laurinavičius
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Abstract

In 1942, when drafting a strategic cooperation treaty between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the foreign secretary Anthony Eden was responsible for preparing projects to solve the Balts’ problems, based on which the Baltic States could preserve limited sovereignty. This aspect has received little attention in historiography, seemingly because it is treated as an ephemeral, insignificant episode. It cannot be dismissed that the provision of a compromise with the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, which was in principle impossible, did apply. However, historical material suggests a different conclusion. This article was also inspired by Henry Kissinger’s opinion that it was the idealism of the US president Franklin D. Roosevelt that prevented Western states from reaching a compromise with Stalin. This article reveals what went on ‘behind the scenes’ in big politics: how the Baltic States factor, in itself rather insignificant to the big states, allows for identifying the prime goal of those big states, to seek power and dominance.
1942年英苏条约的背景:立陶宛(波罗的海国家)问题的妥协解决
1942年,在起草苏联和英国之间的战略合作条约时,外交大臣安东尼·伊登负责准备解决波罗的海问题的项目,在此基础上,波罗的海国家可以保留有限的主权。这方面在史学中很少受到关注,似乎是因为它被视为一个短暂的,无关紧要的插曲。不可否认的是,与苏联独裁者约瑟夫•斯大林(Joseph Stalin)妥协的条款确实适用,而这在原则上是不可能的。然而,历史资料却给出了不同的结论。这篇文章也受到亨利·基辛格观点的启发,他认为正是美国总统富兰克林·d·罗斯福的理想主义阻碍了西方国家与斯大林达成妥协。这篇文章揭示了大国政治“幕后”发生的事情:波罗的海国家的因素,本身对大国来说相当微不足道,如何允许确定这些大国的主要目标,寻求权力和统治地位。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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