{"title":"Money laundering and financial stability: does adverse publicity matter?","authors":"Bahriye Basaran-Brooks","doi":"10.1108/jfrc-09-2021-0075","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nAlready suffering reputational damage from the global financial crisis, banks face a further loss of trust due to their poor money laundering (ML) compliance practices. As confidence-driven institutions, the loss of reputation stemming from inadequate compliance with regulations and policies labels banks as facilitators of crime and destroys public trust both in the bank itself, peer banks and the wider banking system. Considering the links between financial stability and adverse publicity about banks, this paper aims to critically examine the implications of ML-specific bank information on financial stability.\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nThis paper adopts a content analysis and a theoretical discussion by critically evaluating the role of bank compliance information on stability with references to recent case studies.\n\n\nFindings\nThis paper establishes that availability of information regarding a bank involved in or facilitating ML might pose a threat to financial stability if bank counterparties cut their ties with the bank in question and when bank stakeholders show a strong and sudden negative reaction to adverse publicity. Though recent ML scandals have not caused immediate instability, general loss of confidence associated with reputational risk have had a destabilising effect on affected banks’ capital and liquidity.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThere has been surprisingly little discussion to date on the impact of publicly available bank information on financial stability and public confidence within the ML compliance framework. This paper approaches the issue of publicly available banking compliance information solely through the prism of public confidence and reputational risk and its impact on macro-stability by examining recent ML scandals.\n","PeriodicalId":44814,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-09-2021-0075","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
Purpose
Already suffering reputational damage from the global financial crisis, banks face a further loss of trust due to their poor money laundering (ML) compliance practices. As confidence-driven institutions, the loss of reputation stemming from inadequate compliance with regulations and policies labels banks as facilitators of crime and destroys public trust both in the bank itself, peer banks and the wider banking system. Considering the links between financial stability and adverse publicity about banks, this paper aims to critically examine the implications of ML-specific bank information on financial stability.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper adopts a content analysis and a theoretical discussion by critically evaluating the role of bank compliance information on stability with references to recent case studies.
Findings
This paper establishes that availability of information regarding a bank involved in or facilitating ML might pose a threat to financial stability if bank counterparties cut their ties with the bank in question and when bank stakeholders show a strong and sudden negative reaction to adverse publicity. Though recent ML scandals have not caused immediate instability, general loss of confidence associated with reputational risk have had a destabilising effect on affected banks’ capital and liquidity.
Originality/value
There has been surprisingly little discussion to date on the impact of publicly available bank information on financial stability and public confidence within the ML compliance framework. This paper approaches the issue of publicly available banking compliance information solely through the prism of public confidence and reputational risk and its impact on macro-stability by examining recent ML scandals.
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1992, the Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance has provided an authoritative and scholarly platform for international research in financial regulation and compliance. The journal is at the intersection between academic research and the practice of financial regulation, with distinguished past authors including senior regulators, central bankers and even a Prime Minister. Financial crises, predatory practices, internationalization and integration, the increased use of technology and financial innovation are just some of the changes and issues that contemporary financial regulators are grappling with. These challenges and changes hold profound implications for regulation and compliance, ranging from macro-prudential to consumer protection policies. The journal seeks to illuminate these issues, is pluralistic in approach and invites scholarly papers using any appropriate methodology. Accordingly, the journal welcomes submissions from finance, law, economics and interdisciplinary perspectives. A broad spectrum of research styles, sources of information and topics (e.g. banking laws and regulations, stock market and cross border regulation, risk assessment and management, training and competence, competition law, case law, compliance and regulatory updates and guidelines) are appropriate. All submissions are double-blind refereed and judged on academic rigour, originality, quality of exposition and relevance to policy and practice. Once accepted, individual articles are typeset, proofed and published online as the Version of Record within an average of 32 days, so that articles can be downloaded and cited earlier.